University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

Summer 1996

Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads
Lynn M. LoPucki
University of Florida Levin College of Law, lopucki@law.ufl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1498
(1996)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Copyright 1996 by Northwestern University, School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 90,No. 4

LEGAL CULTURE, LEGAL STRATEGY, AND
THE LAW IN LAWYERS' HEADS
Lynn M. LoPucki*
Most lawyers and judges experience law as a process of logical
deduction. They believe they apply the law laid down by legislatures
and appellate courts to the facts of cases and generate answers.' Most
law professors at elite schools (and many of the best trial lawyers)
hold this "Formalist '2 view of law in contempt. They espouse a competing "Realist ' 3 view in which law is an inductive process, judges
* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I thank Rick Abel, Stuart Banner,
Jean Braucher, Kathy Brickey, Lincoln Brooks, Corinne Cooper, Clark Cunningham, Ted Eisenberg, Frances Foster, Marc Galanter, Bob Hillman, Dan Keating, Ronald Mann, Matjorie Murphy, Larry Ponoroff, Jeff Rachlinski, Thomas Redding, Bob Summers, Elizabeth Warren, Leila
Wexler, Walter Weyrauch, Bill Whitford, and participants in an informal workshop at Washington University for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and Jennifer Bae and David
Conway for assistance with research.
1 See, e.g., Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law
Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YAE LEJ. 1663, 1667 (1989) ("Legal problems are understood to be technical, and clients on their own are assumed not to have sufficient knowledge to
cope adequately with them. When lawyers articulate the legitimating assumptions of law, they
portray success in the legal system as dependent upon expert knowledge and the shrewd application of legal rules.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The divorce lawyers Sarat and Felstiner studied de-emphasized the importance of rules in legal practice, but Sarat and Felstiner
themselves attribute that to the high level of judicial discretion invited by the rules governing
divorce. Id. at 1676 n.51.
2 1 use the term "Formalism" not in some technical sense, but merely as the best available
shorthand for the view described in the previous sentence. Other words expressing essentially
the same idea are "legal positivism" and "determinate" when "determinate" is applied to law.
See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and
the Constitution,37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 179-81 (1986) (defining "formalism"); Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (arguing in favor of formalism). Weinrib uses
"Formalism" in a sense I find indistinguishable from "natural law." The concept of Formalism I
employ here is the one he denounces as law "wafting down from the publicly recognized organs
of power." Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE
L.J. 949, 956 (1988).
3 "Realism" has been used in such a variety of ways that it seems no longer to have a
technical sense. I use it for its association with the idea that law logically mandates no particular
result in real cases, but instead leaves judges "legally free [to decide cases as they please]."
David Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism-A Pathological Study, 66 CORNELL L.
REv. 949, 953 (1981). The distinction I intend is captured in Professor Robert Summers's contrast of formalistic and non-formalistic views of law. See Robert S. Summers, PragmaticInstrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our
Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 867 n.4 (1981).
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choose results, and plausible legal justifications are rarely in short supply.4 To these Realists, the nuances of legal doctrine seem wholly unimportant; they determine nothing. 5 Perhaps as an expression of their
contempt for legal doctrine,
scholars at elite law schools have largely
6
abandoned its study.

The triumph of Realism in legal academia has left lawyers and
judges unconvinced. As Weinrib put it:
Legal activity invariably takes place within some structure, however lax.
No matter how often the impossibility of such structure is announced by
academics, murmurs of disbelief are heard in the trenches below. Legal
formalism is the effort to make sense of the lawyer's perception of an
intelligible order. This is why in the last two centuries formalism
has
7
been killed again and again, but has always refused to stay dead.

Weinrib claims to find the structure that explains Formalism's refusal
to stay dead in natural law.8 This Article argues for an entirely different explanation. Law exists in the minds of lawyers in a form separate

and critically different from its form on the books.9 The law in law-

yers' heads is largely formalistic and the process by which it is applied
4 See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 199,204 ("Because
the legal world is comprised of contradictory rules, there will be sound legal arguments available
not only for the hypothesis one is investigating, but for other, competing hypotheses as well.")
5 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 Mici. L.
REv. 2075, 2078 (1993) ("[Most law teachers] would argue that, although doctrine supplies the
language of legal-or rather, judicial-decisionmaking, it is not the major factor in deciding
cases and that purely doctrinal scholarship is therefore of quite limited utility.").
6 In keeping with the Realist view, Weyrauch describes the central theme of elite legal education in the United States as one of skepticism: nothing is true, and even if it were, one could
not prove it. See WALTER 0. wEYRAUCH, HRARCHIm DER AUSBILDUNGSSTATrEN, REcHrsSTUDIUM uND RECET IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN 29 n.47 (Juristische Studiengesellschaft

Karlsruhe Nr. 129, 1976) (referring to the attitude of elite American universities as one of fundamental skepticism as attributed to Gorgias: "nothing exists; if anything exists, it could not be
known; if it could be known, that knowledge could not be communicated").
7 Weinrib, supra note 2, at 951.
8 Other scholars have attempted to reconcile the competing claims of Formalism and Realism. See eg., Pierre Bourdieu, The Forceof Law: Toward a Sociology of the JuridicalField, 38
HASTINGS LJ. 805, 815-16 (1987) ("In order to break with the formalist ideology, which assumes
independence of the law and of legal professionals, without simultaneously falling into the contrary instrumentalist conception, it is necessary to realize that these two antagonistic perspectives, one from within, the other from outside the law, together simply ignore the existence of an
entire social universe (what I will term the 'juridical field') .... [I]t is within this universe that
juridical authority is produced and exercised.").
9 Other scholars have noted the existence of unwritten rules of law that tend to prevail over
written rules. See JEROLD S. AuERBACH, JusrIcE WITHoUT LAw? 19-30 (1983) (demonstrating
that various religious communities have succeeded in establishing community law that prevails
over written law promulgated by the state); Todd R. Benson, Taking Security in China: Approaching U.S. Practices, 21 YALE INT'L L. 183 (1996) (discussing sharp differences between
written law and practices as described by Chinese lawyers interviewed); Keith S. Rosenn, The
Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System and its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMp. L. 514 (1971); Walter 0. Weyrauch & Maureen A. Bell, Autonomous
Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE L. 323, 330-31, 364-66 (1993). For a more
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is largely deductive. The Formalists are correctly reporting on their
own experience. The Realists, who consider only the written law, are
at least largely correct in their conclusion that it is overwhelmingly
indeterminate. The problem is that neither the Formalists nor the
Realists have yet recognized the existence and importance of the separate realm of law in lawyers' heads and its power to drive legal
outcomes.
When law is applied, it is always through the agency of a human
mind. That mind must absorb both the law and the situation to which
it is to be applied, represent them internally, make the application,
and report the results. It is mental representations-referred to in the
cognitive psychology literature as "mental models"-not written law,
by which lawyers and judges process cases. They can and sometimes
do describe the law contained in their mental models in speech and in
writing. The law in those models is remarkably simple, virtually black
letter. That simplicity embarrasses the lawyers and judges. When
pressed on a point, they are likely to scramble for a book or offer to
prepare a memorandum.
American jurisprudence has yet to recognize the law in lawyers'
heads. 10 The literature that comes closest is the literature that seeks

to explain judicial decision making phenomenologically." But that
literature does not explain the process in the judge's head so much as
it describes the inputs and outputs. To the extent it attempts direct
description of what happens "in between," it speaks almost exclusively of such mystical concepts
as the "judicial hunch,"'12 "practical
14
reason,"' 3 and "balancing.'

lucid statement of Auerbach's point, see Corinne Cooper, Justice Without Law? A Search
Through History for Contemporary Solutions, 48 ALB. L. REv. 741, 745-46 (1984).
10 The psychological nature of law is, by contrast, a principal tenet of Scandinavian Legal
Realism. See infra note 210.
11 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication:A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDuC. 518 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86
MIcH. L. REv. 827 (1988). Legal scholars have used the insights of cognitive psychology to
illuminate the subjects law addresses as distinguished from the law itself. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (arguing
against basing economic analyses on the assumption of rational decisionmaking and describing
alternative decisionmaking algorithms as "strategies"). But see Robert E. Scott, Errorand Rationality in IndividualDecisionmaking:An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions
and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 329 (1986) (arguing against adjustments to
consumer law to attempt to compensate for consumers' cognitive illusions).
12 Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). The idea of the hunch is still being taken seriously
today. See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunck An Essay on Discretion, 41
HASTINGS LJ. 231, 279 (1990) ("[T]he Realists were right in emphasizing the importance of the
judicial hunch.").
13 Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism,and the Rule
of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533 (1992).

1500

90:1498 (1996)

The Law in Lawyers' Heads

This Article attempts to probe the "in-between," using a combination of empirical data, anecdote, insights from cognitive theory, and
speculation. It is a preliminary effort to deal with uncharted realms.
Most of the examples I use are from the field with which I am most
familiar, debtor-creditor relations. 15 Nothing inherent in the ideas I
present suggests that they are limited in applicability to that field.
I approach the subject with an attitude developed during eight
years of legal practice in a relatively small legal community and confirmed through empirical research in other relatively small legal communities that process bankruptcy cases. Within such communities, the
law in lawyers' heads plays a dominant role. A shared mental model
of law implicitly proclaims "this is how we do things" (or, if the conversation should skip to a higher plane, "this is the right thing to do").
The challenger who would have them do otherwise must demonstrate
that the law requires it. Because the written law is permeated with
exceptions, ambiguities, and authorizations for the exercise of discretion, the challenger can rarely do so. The view contained in the model
nearly always will be consistent with some interpretation of the written law, and that is all it takes for the model to prevail. In these communities, the shared mental model is primary law, and the written law
merely background with which the model interacts. 16 Sensing the relative unimportance of the written law to the processing of cases, lawyers and judges are quick to delegate research to law clerks and new
associates.
The theories presented in this Article can be summarized as follows: Law is practiced mostly in communities. Those communities
forge shared mental models of the law and process cases principally in
accord with them. The law contained in the models is a gross simplification of written law, distorted in ways that render it highly determinate. While these shared mental models interact with written law and
14 See T. Alexander Alienikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L-. 943

(1987) (arguing that balancing is merely a metaphor that cloaks an essentially political process of
decisionmaking). But see Kennedy, supra note 11 (examining the factors in the judge's choice
and discussing what are essentially mental models of written law).
15 Legal scholars are most likely to be capable of seeing the difference between the written
law and the law in shared mental models in the fields of the scholars' own expertise. When
exploring a field in which one is not an expert, it is easy to fall victim to the kinds of shared
mental models that law professors create for their students. See infra note 209. To the outsider,
those models appear to be written law. In fact, they are often general models that express the
academic community's shared mental model, which may be very different from written law in the
area.
16 For an interesting expression of essentially this idea, see Walter 0. Weyrauch, Book Review, 42 AM. J. CoMP. L. 807, 808 (1994) ("Since the vast majority of cases in all fields of law are
settled before they reach the appellate level or even the lower courts, these settlements are likely
to be based on experiential norms of what is tenable under the circumstances, although only
vaguely related to traditional written law.").
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are to significant degrees products of it, they are at the same time
highly resistant to written law.
Shared mental models explain not only the determinate nature of
law as experienced by lawyers and judges, but also two other legal
phenomena for which current explanations are inadequate. The first
is persistent, systematic differences in legal outcomes between communities governed by the same written law. The second is the prevalence and effectiveness of legal strategy, particularly legal strategy that
seems to compel judges to decide cases against both their personal
preferences 17 and what they believe to be the intentions of the
lawmakers.
These explanations depend on the factual premise of a community processing repetitive caseloads and therefore capable of forging a
shared mental model. They are limited to circumstances where the
premise holds. With no data on how much of the practice of law occurs under these circumstances it is difficult to predict how widely the
ideas presented here apply. Some lawyers and judges work in environments where repeat players are the exception, and the group working on a case starts from ground zero, that is, written law, in the
construction of their legal reality.' 8 But I suspect that such lawyers
and judges are in the minority. 19 For most, law is an exercise in community relations in a community whose expertise is not captured well
in written law.
Part I of this Article begins by presenting evidence of persistent,
systematic differences in legal outcomes between communities governed by the same written law. It then explains how mental models
shared within legal communities could produce those differences.
Part II argues that the determinate nature of shared mental models renders them vulnerable to manipulation through legal strategy. It
explores that vulnerability and the models' defenses to it. Part III
then presents two partial theories about how law evolves. The first
holds that lawyers are socially constrained in the number of challenges
they can make to the shared mental model; how they exercise their
limited challenges determines the direction of change. The second
holds change to emanate from a dialectic in which legal strategy first
achieves results thought unattainable. That leads to a new set of expectations and, finally, to the collapse of the old rules into a new set of
rules that explain the new expectations directly.
17 Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 9, at 382-85. Weyrauch and Bell have presented a theory of
legal strategy, which is discussed infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
18 These lawyers and judges may construct a shared mental model during a long trial.
19 Mental models can be of substantive law, legal procedure, or both. While repetition in the
applicable substantive law may not be the norm, repetition in the procedures applied in legal
practice clearly is.
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Part IV first explores the explanatory implications of the law in
lawyers' heads. Law is psychological phenomena; systematic differences in legal outcomes from community to community are not only
possible but inevitable; and any attempt to alter the situation will
render legal communities less efficient. Part IV then turns to the normative implications. It argues that strategic analysis has important advantages over economic analysis as a means of understanding law; that
the legal system should strive for a level of simplicity at which it is
understandable by the governed; and that lawyers and judges should
attempt to write the unwritten law that governs their various communities. Part V summarizes the argument and conclusions.
A brief comment on the methodology employed in this Article
may be helpful to the reader. Much of what passes for theory in legal
'20
scholarship is in fact what I have called "paradigm dominance.
Such pseudo-theory argues for a particular way of thinking about
some subject and may provide a catchy label, but ultimately makes no
empirically testable assertions. Professors Warren and Westbrook
have proposed, as the antidote to such armchair theorizing, that scholars routinely propose empirical research, in part to begin the process
of testing their theories, but in part merely to assure that their theories
have anything at all to say about reality.21 In recognition of the need
for that kind of discipline, I explain at various points how the assertions I make might be operationalized 22 and empirically tested.
20 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, Methodological Realities, and the Paradigm Dominance Game, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307,1307-10 (1994) (describing the paradigm dominance game).
21 Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Searchingfor Reorganization Realities,72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1257, 1259-62 (1994); see Robert C. Clark, The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1268 (1981) (arguing that "a theory should be treated as vacuous unless
it is formulated so as to be falsifiable or infirmable by evidence yet to be collected"). Cognitive
psychologists seeking to develop a working model of the mind recognized the danger of empty
theorizing even earlier. They require that theories about the operation of the mind be expressed
as "effective procedures," by which they mean procedures that will run on a computer. Such
expression assures that the procedures could run in a human mind. See, e.g., P.N. JoHNsoNLAIRD, MENTAL MODELS 4-8 (1983).

22 Among social scientists, a concept is said to be operationalized when it is expressed in
objectively verifiable terms. See, e.g., David Lewin, Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes, 66 CHI.KENT L. REv.823,
831 (1990) (operationalizing "grievance procedure effectiveness" as numerical responses to the
question: "Overall, on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being 'excellent,' 5 being 'average,' and 1 being
'poor,' how would you rate the grievance procedure?"); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood
for Artificial Intelligences,70 N.C. L. REv. 1231,1235-36 (1992) (describing Turing's operationalization of "thinking" as the ability to persuade a human subject in conversation that the machine
is human); Joseph E. Scott, Book Review, 78 J. Calm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1145, 1151-52 (1987)
(describing proposal by a member of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography to
operationalize "pornography" as material that aroused more than five percent of men as measured by a penile plethymoraphs machine). Compare STEWART MACAULAY, LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN & JOHN STOOKEY, LAW & SociETY, READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 51 (1995)

("[D]eciding how to measure a variable is called 'operationalizing' the variable.") with MARY G.

1503

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I.

A.

LAW AS SHARED MENTAL MODEL

GeographicalInconsistencies in Legal Outcomes

In the late 1970s, I was one of three lawyers who did most of the
bankruptcy work in the Gainesville Division of the Northern District
of Florida. The situation commonly arose in which a close relative
made a bona fide loan of money to a debtor before bankruptcy and
the debtor then sought to repay the money under a Chapter 11 plan.
The court routinely permitted repayment of the relative just as it
would a creditor who lent "at arms length." If the relative's loan was
unsecured, it shared pro-rata with other unsecured loans; if the relative's loan was secured, it could have priority over the others. The
fact that the loan was from a relative went to the factual issue of
whether the loan actually had been made or the mixed fact-law issue
of whether the loan had been made in good faith. But so long as the
loan had been made in good faith, we saw it as of equal dignity with
any other.
In one of my cases, the debtor's mother had lent him money and
taken a third mortgage against the business premises. A lawyer from
a city sixty-five miles away who represented a competing creditor objected to the claim of the debtor's mother and sought to have it "equitably subordinated" to the claims of all other creditors. My initial
reaction was that the objection was absurd. But when finally forced to
research the matter, I found an ocean of legal doctrine making a variety of distinctions among loans by relatives. 23 The written law was
complex and ambiguous with regard to the case at hand. The judge,
who regularly sat on Gainesville cases and never sat on cases in the
challenger's home city, disposed of the case quickly and in accord with
my initial reaction to it. I breathed a sigh of relief, made a mental
note of the existence of that previously uncharted (by me) ocean of
legal doctrine, and continued to draft Chapter 11 plans that repaid
relatives on the same basis as arms-length lenders.
A few years later, I conducted empirical research on Chapter 11
cases in the Western District of Missouri. 24 Much to my surprise, I
found that every Chapter 11 plan filed in that district separately classified loans from the debtor's relatives and subordinated their repayment to the repayment of other creditors. Loans from relatives
effectively were treated as equity investments that could be repaid
only if the business survived.
KwErr & ROBERT W. KwErr, CONCEPrs AND METHODS FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 21, 165-74
(1981) (explaining techniques for operationalizing concepts in social research).
23 See, e.g., Jules S. Cohen, ShareholderAdvances: Capitalor Loans?, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J.
259 (1978).
24 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter11 of the
Bankruptcy Code? (pts. 1-2), 57 AM. BANKR. LJ. 99,247 (1983) (reporting results of the study).
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The cause of this difference could not have been a difference in
written law. The governing body of written law-bankruptcy law in
general and the bankruptcy doctrine of equitable subordination in
particular-is federal law equally applicable in both districts. Something other than written law was at work.
Substantial, systematic differences in legal outcomes that cannot
be accounted for by differences in written law are a common feature
of the American legal system. 25 Discussions of these kinds of differences often invoke Dean Roscoe Pound's distinction between "law in
action" and "law on the books. ' 26 Today, such differences are likely
to be attributed to "local legal culture." Probably the best definition
of local legal culture is that offered by Professors Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook:
[S]ystematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as a consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared by many
practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and expectations existing in
other localities subject to the same or a similar formal legal regime.27
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook provide vivid examples of local legal
culture at work in the processing of consumer bankruptcy cases. They
25 See Austin Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the UnfortunatePersistence of a Research Tradition,9 LEGAL SruD. F. 23, 30 (1985) (describing a genre of scholarship
knows as "legal effectiveness" or "gap" studies that examine empirically the gap between law in
action and law on the books). Use of the term "gap" to apply to the numerous examples of
practices that deviated from the law on the books apparently originated with Professor Richard
Abel. See Richard L. Abel, Law Books and Books About Law, 26 STAN.L. REV. 175, 184-89
(1974) (discussing explanations for the existence of the gap).
In commenting on a draft of this Article, Professor Lawrence Ponoroff wrote:
I practiced for many years with a large Denver-based firm, but in a branch office in Colorado Springs. I had a case in El Paso district court in which I had served requests for admissions. The other side failed to either respond or request, formally or informally, an
extension of time to file prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period to respond. Therefore, in my pretrial statement, I indicated that, per the rules, each of these matters was
deemed admitted at trial. The other lawyer called me, casually apologized for not contacting me earlier, and said he needed more time. I refused on the basis that I could no longer
accommodate him when to do so would be materially prejudicial to the advantage my clients had gained as a consequence of his earlier, unexcused dilatoriness. He expressed outrage at my refusal on the basis, among other things, that I was trying to practice "Denverlaw" in Colorado Springs. To make a long story short, the judge saw it the same way, even
though the rules were crystal clear on the point.
Letter from Lawrence Ponoroff, Professor of Law, Tlane Law School, to the author 2 (Oct. 20,
1995) (on file with the author).
26 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. Rav. 12 (1910).
27 Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistenceof Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence
From the FederalBankruptcy Courts, 17 HAv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 801, 804 (1994). The earlier
definitions offered by Church were simpler but less explanatory. Thomas W. Church, Jr., Civil
Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JusT. Sys. J. 166, 181 (1978) (referring to "a stable set of
expectations, practices and informal rules of behavior which, for want of a better term, we have
called 'local legal culture' "); Thomas W. Church, Jr., Examining Local Legal Culture, 1985 L. &
Soc. INoumY 449, 451 (1985) (referring to "the practitioner norms governing case handling and
participant behavior in a criminal court").
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also provide, if not the first, certainly the most developed description
2
of mechanisms by which local legal cultures affect legal outcomes. 8

The mechanisms Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook discovered are
mechanisms by which judges, lawyers, and other officials influence
debtors' decisions whether to file for bankruptcy relief and, if they
file, under which chapter. 29 For example, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook found that in some instances judges awarded more generous
fees to attorneys who filed cases under the chapter the judge preferred
30
and embarrassed lawyers in front of their clients when they did not.

They present dramatic evidence of differences from district to district
in the percentages of people filing bankruptcy and in the relative proportions of Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 13 debt adjustment
proceedings. 31
In a study of payments by debtors to their unsecured creditors in
cases under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, Professor Jean
Braucher found that "[Chapter 13 trustees and judges in the four cities effectively deter 0% plans and keep most plans above a floor percent that is known to local practitioners." 32 The floor percentages for
routine confirmation she discovered were as follows:
Austin
25 to 33 percent
Dayton
10 percent
Cincinnati
70 percent 33
100 percent
San Antonio
What makes these findings particularly interesting is that the written
law requires that the court consider repayment proposals on a caseby-case basis, 34 that debtors be required to pay only what they can
afford,35 and that debtors be permitted to file even if they can afford
28 Prior to the publication of The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, many commentators

regarded the theory of local legal culture as a mere tautology or category for residual phenomena not explained by other theories. Mary L. Luskin & Robert C. Luskin, Why So Fas4 Why So
Slow?: Explaining Case Processing Time, 77 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190,212 (1986) ("[F]or

local legal culture to be more than a residual or catch-all variable, it must consist of clearly
specified norms and expectations. To date, the norms and expectations in local legal culture

remain largely unspecified.") (citation omitted); George L. Priest, Private Litigantsand the Court
Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REv. 527,530 (1989) ("At this level, the legal culture hypothesis
is irrefutable but, regrettably, tautologous.").

29 Sullivan et al., supra note 27, at 839-57.
30 Id. at 844-45.
31 ld.at 817-27.
32 Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 501, 532 (1993).
33 Id. at 532.

34 In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[B]ankruptcy courts should determine a
debtor's good faith on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular features of each
Chapter 13 plan."); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,432 (7th Cir. 1982) (requiring consideration on a
case-by-case basis with substantiality of repayment one of many factors to be considered).
35 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (1994) (requiring that all of debtor's "disposable income" be
devoted to payments under the plan).
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of these rules of
to pay nothing at all.3 6 Thus the very existence
38
thumb37 arguably violates the written law.
These two studies, like the story that opened this Part, demonstrate systematic differences in legal outcomes between cities. 3 9 Nothing apparent in the written law, in the kinds of cases that arose, or in
the nonlegal cultures of the cities plausibly explains the extent and
systematic nature of the differences. I argue below that differences
such as these are a product of shared mental models of the law.
Shared mental models affect settlements as well as adjudications.
They can cause settlements to deviate, not only from the written law,
but also from the leverages the parties would have in litigation. In our
study of the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies, Whitford and I documented that settlements almost uniformly
deviated from the legal entitlements of the parties as specified in the
"absolute priority rule. '40 The rule entitled creditors to absolute priority over shareholders in distributions under the plan. Yet creditors
routinely agreed to plans that permitted distributions to shareholders
worth millions of dollars, even though the plans did not provide for
full payment of their own claims. Thus the settlements deviated from
the formal legal entitlements.
These bargains did not occur strictly in the shadow of the likely
outcome in litigation. In interviews, the lawyers who negotiated these
settlements asserted that the deviations were necessary to obtain consensus and that consensus was necessary because the size of these
cases made them impractical to litigate. Whitford and I found, however, that in the first three cases that were not settled, the litigation
36 See In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that zero-repayment plans

are legally permissible); see also supra note 35.
37 Some may object to the expression "rule of thumb" because of its putative origins. See
State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 60 (1874) (asserting the prior existence of a legal doctrine "that a
husband had a right to whip his wife, provided he used a switch no larger than his thumb," but
providing no citation and referring to the putative doctrine as a "barbarism"). It is, however, the
only expression likely to trigger in many readers an association with the broad array of informal
norms to which I refer.
38 In the first years after adoption of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy courts formally
established rules of thumb regarding the percentages of repayment that were acceptable. The
appellate courts responded by striking those rules down. See supra note 34.
39 Differences in legal outcomes between cities that cannot be accounted for on the basis of
written law frequently occur outside the United States as well. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg &
Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter11? The Evidencefrom Japan,23 J. LEGAL STUD.
111, 155 (1994) (describing regional variations); TmEODORE EISENBERG, CREATING AN EFFECTIVE SWEDISH RECONSTRUCON LAW 61-62 (1995) (describing sharp regional variations in the
use of national reconstruction and bankruptcy laws in Sweden).
40 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Larg Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. Rlv. 125, 142 (1990)
(showing that creditors routinely consented to equity holders, sharing in the distributions of
insolvent companies despite creditors' clear legal entitlement to the contrary, because of various
practical leverages generated in reorganization proceedings).
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proved easily ' manageable.
Underwater shareholder interests could be
"zeroed out."4 1 We concluded that another dynamic was driving the
settlements:
Although these cases were spread throughout the United States, most of
the lawyers who played key roles in them were members of the same
legal community. They could expect to be involved in future cases with
their current adversaries and were to various degrees dependent on
those adversaries for professional respect and advancement. They were
not entirely free to ignore the conventional wisdom that consensual
plans were the responsible, appropriate means for accomplishing reorganization and that despite the absolute priority rule, everyone at the
bargaining table was entitled to a share.42

Had it not been for the existence of a shared mental model that predicted that litigation was impractical, many more of the cases might
have been litigated and the litigation might have gone more smoothly.
In the complex web of a major bankruptcy reorganization, the law and
the actual bargaining leverages of the parties may be less important
than the shared understanding of the43 community as to the law and the
bargaining leverages of the parties.

The examples I present here are only a small sample from a large
body of empirical studies showing deviation of the law in action from
the law on the books. 44 I refrain from presenting more only because
the existence of substantial deviations is not in dispute.
41 Id. at 144-46.

42 Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
43 To illustrate, assume that on a given set of facts, the law creates no entitlement for shareholders and all lawyers understand the law that way. However, all lawyers other than Smith
believe litigation to that result would cost several millions of dollars in expense and delay, so the
only reasonable solution is a settlement that gives shareholders one million dollars. Smith believes that the difficulty of this kind of litigation is overrated, and once a case has been litigated,
the myth of difficulty will disperse. Smith, as attorney for the Unsecured Creditors' Committee,
nevertheless may not be able to litigate, because (1) the lawyers for individual members of the
Committee will reject his proposal to buck the conventional wisdom, (2) the first challenges to
the conventional wisdom are likely to be hotly contested because they seek a result contrary to
the shared mental model, so they are likely to be much more expensive than otherwise necessary, and (3) Smith may suffer reputational damage if Smith attempts to raise the issue and is not
successful in this case.
44 E.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer As Translator,Representation As Text: Towards
an Ethnographyof Legal Discourse,77 CORNELL L. REV.1298, 1320-22 (1992) (reporting anecdote in which a judge approves an "attitude ticket" in accord with practice and admittedly in
violation of Supreme Court decisions); ROBERT E. RODEs, JR. T AL, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE
FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 85 (1981) (finding an "all or

nothing" approach to the imposition of discovery sanctions, rather than the "scheme of increasingly severe sanctions" contemplated by written law); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against
Risks, 86 COLuM. L. REv.495, 556, 557 (1986) ("Much environmental legislation is absolutist in
language, but more lenient in administration.... [Sophisticated firms] comprehend that the
'real' law, the law in action as opposed to the law on the books, is the accumulation and extension of actual decisions reached by agencies, rather than the absolutist language of the statutes
themselves.").
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B.

Mental Models

Mental models are a central concept of modern cognitive theory.45 That is, "human beings understand the world by constructing
'46
working models of it in their minds.
The leading theories differ in their assertions as to the types of
models constructed, the manner in which information is stored in
them, and the ease with which humans can revise or reconstruct their
mental models. But all seem to agree that our mental models are not
simply text, beliefs, images, or schemata in the narrow sense of mere
visual images. 47 They are representational maps of the world in which
we live. They form a model in that their parts are integrated to form a
usable whole. Cognitive theorists assert that the relationships among
the parts of such a model mimic the relationships understood by the
modeler to exist among the parts of the world.48 What we know subjectively as the experience of understanding is, in objective terms, the
process of modeling. Understanding is not in the parts, but in the relationship among the parts.

45 The concept of "mental models" originates in the literature of cognitive psychology, see
e.g., JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 21, and the closely related field of artificial intelligence, see,
e.g., MAnvIN MINSKY, Tim SocmIT OF MIND 303 (1985). Dominant theory in cognitive psychology postulates that the human mind works by constructing models that have similar "relation-structures" to the processes they imitate. These models are working models in that they are
dynamic and at least purport to work in the same way as the processes they parallel, but they are
not necessarily workable in that they may contain inaccuracies or internal contradictions. JOHNsoN-LAm=, supranote 21, at 3-4, 8-9. "[M]odels of reality need neither be wholly accurate nor
correspond completely with what they model in order to be useful." Id.at 3. JoHN H. HOLLAND
ET AL, INDUCrION 12 (1986) ("In common with many recent theoretical treatments, we believe
that cognitive systems construct models of the problem space that are then mentally 'run,' or
manipulated to produce expectations about the environment.").
46 JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 21, at 10. For the use of a similar model in jury research, see
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 519 (1991) (arguing from empirical studies that jurors decide cases
by constructing coherent stories from evidence and matching the stories to permissible verdicts).
47 The literature of cognitive psychology contains a wide variety of theories of the nature of
the mental structures employed in thinking. Words such as "schemata" are assigned a variety of
meanings. See Blasi, infra note 50, at 339 ("The relation between the concepts of schemas and
mental models [in the cognitive science literature] is less than precise."). I do not mean to endorse one to the exclusion of another. But the idea of a working mental representation of a
portion of the world is essential to my concept of mental model. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
48 J.A.W. Kamp, A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation, Report of Center of Cognitive Science, University of Texas at Austin (unpublished), cited in JONSON-LAmD, supranote
21, at 439 ("A text represented in a discourse model is true provided that there is a mapping of
the individuals and events in the discourse model into the real world model in a way that preserves their respective properties and the relations between them."). See also id. at 399-406
(contrasting the cognitive process of modeling with the "cognitive" process of automatons).
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C. Law as Mental Models
The subjects of mental models include not only the physical
world, but also abstractions of the kinds dealt with in law49 and, I argue here, the abstractions of law itself. That is, a person who can
demonstrate an understanding of a particular legal subject or concept
has, in his or her mind, a working mental model of the subject or concept. The model "works" in that the person can apply the model to
fact patterns to reach the appropriate conclusions.50 What tells us the
mental manifestation is an integrated model rather than merely a collection of facts or rules is that, using the model, the person quickly and
easily can state conclusions about the subject that were not express in
the facts and rules from which the person constructed the model.51
. Written law is invariably expressed in words. The law in mental
models is not. I have in mind a mental model of the election available
to creditors under Bankruptcy Code § 1111(b).5 2 I could explain the
election in my own words (perhaps correctly, perhaps not), but I could
not tell you what words are used in the statute. If I explained the
election more than once, I probably would use different words each
time.53 What I would explain would be the sense of the election. I
would tell you why I think Congress put it there, how a creditor makes
the election, what legal concepts are employed in the model, and what
effect the election might have on the electing creditor's recovery.
Based on the interactions of nearly thirty years as a lawyer and
then a law professor, I believe that essentially most lawyers and law
students mentally model law this way.54 Though we remember many
phrases and sometimes entire statutes word-for-word, we know and
49 See, e.g., JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 21, at 416-19 (describing the concept of "ownership"

in lay terms).
50 The model need not be "correct" in any absolute sense. Nor does it have to be in the mind
of a lawyer. For examples of mental models of law in the minds of lay people see Robert C.
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN.
L. REv. 623, 670 (1986) (Shasta County laymen's model of law governing trespass by cattle);
JOHNSoN-LAIRD, supranote 21, at 416-19 (cognitive theorist's model of the effect of ownership).

The key, salient characteristic of the model is that it "run." See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers
Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functionsof Theory, 45 J. LEGAL ED.
313, 318 (1995) ("[T]he schematic knowledge enables experts to construct mental models that
capture much of the complexity of the situation, and to 'run' the mental models in simulation in
order to evaluate the likely consequences of alternative courses of action.").
51 See Blasi, supra note 50, at 344-45 (discussing the relationship between speed and expertise in legal problem solving).
52 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1994).
53 One of my explanations appears in LYNN M. LoPucKI, STRATEOmS FOR CREDITORS IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS § 12.9.4 (2d ed. 1991).
54 Duncan Kennedy, for example, describes his understanding of the relationship among case

holdings as "fields" and describes them as graphics. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 538-44; e.g.,
GETING GRAPHIc: VISUAL TOOLS FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING UCC AND BANKRUPTCY

LAW (Corinne Cooper ed., 1993) (reproducing the graphics used by dozens of law professors).
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confidently use much law we cannot recite. Quite clearly, the law in
55 In
our mental models is not the literal texts from which we learn it.
examining the contents of my own mental models of particular provisions of law, I find simple fact patterns together with their stock solutions, 56 graphics, and sometimes the size and location on the page of
the text that would answer my question-though I may have only the
vaguest recollection of the content of that text. I remember from
practice some twenty years ago the phrase "could have or might have"
in connection with the qualification of expert medical witnesses to testify to the cause of an injury. Though I do not remember either the
antecedent or the consequence of the rule, I remember enough of the
context in which the rule was applied to reconstruct them in my own
words.
In particular areas I am aware that I know more than I can bring
to consciousness without considerable effort.57 Underlying these fragments is a strong sense that all these pieces are related to each other
to form a coherent structure. Using this structure, I can produce
roughly the same solutions to legal problems as others in my field.58
Portions of both the process and the information I use are subconscious, by which I mean that I cannot describe them to you, even after
I have used them.59
The salient characteristics of these "mental models" of law are as
follows: (1) not all information included in the model is text, (2) the
model "works" in that it can be used to solve problems and answer
questions, including novel ones,60 and (3) items of information are not
merely memorized, but related to other items of information in such a
way as to give the model a structure. 61 The nature of these models
can be further elaborated by consideration of the concept of the "reason for the rule." 62 All but the dullest students of law understand that
55 I have encountered students for whom I think the situation may be otherwise. They seem
obsessed with the precise wording of rules and rely heavily on memorization. They seem to
constitute not more than about one percent of the students I have taught.
56 Blasi identifies such patterns as the primary manifestations of legal expertise. See Blasi,
supra note 50, at 335-38.
57 See infra note 59.
58 The ability of the model to generate the same results in the minds of different people is the
acid test of a shared mental model of law. See eg., Kennedy, supranote 11, at 561 ("[D]eciding
how to apply [a rule] involves a social, hence in some sense a subjective process.... I've many
times had discussions with others in which we formulated rules together, seemed to agree about
their terms, then engaged in a series of applications, and found that once we'd agreed on the
formula we came up with the same answer to the question: how does the rule apply here?").
59 See John F. Kihlstrom, The Cognitive Unconscious,237 ScMncE 1445 (1987); Richard E.
Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know, 84 PsYcH. REV. 231 (1977).
60 See supra notes 45, 47.
61 HOLLAND Er AL, supra note 45, at 29-39.
62 See, eg., Ketelson v. Stilz, 111 N.E. 423,425 (Ind.1916) ("One of [English common law's]
oldest maxims was that where the reason of a rule ceased the rule also ceased."); 1 WswAm
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one cannot derive legal outcomes by applying a rule of law, whether
derived from case law or statute, literally and mechanically to a set of
facts. For example, Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) provides in part that "a
[bankruptcy] petition.., operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of ... any act to ... recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." 63 Read literally,
this provision would bar a secured creditor from asking the debtor to
reaffirm a debt that would be discharged in the bankruptcy case.
From the creditor's point of view, the sole purpose of reaffirmation is
recovery of the claim. The legislative history starkly supports the literal reading. 64 Yet adoption of the provision did not change practices. 65 When practices contrary to the literal reading and the
legislative history have been presented to the courts, the courts uniformly have affirmed the practices, provided the request for reaffirmation was polite and reasonable. 66 Despite the necessity to interpret
the provision in a highly non-literal manner to keep the system workaCOMMENTARIES *70 (This asserts that "[tihe law is the perfection of reason.... it
always intends to conform thereto, and ... what is not reason is not law. Not that the particular
reason of every rule in the law can at this distance of time be always precisely aligned; but it is
sufficient that there be nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to reason."); KARL N. LIwELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 157-58 (1951) ("The rule follows where its reason leads, where the
reason stops, there stops the rule.").
The concept of the "reason for the rule" dominates common-law jurisprudence. A LEXIS
search for that phrase discovers use in more than 11,000 legal opinions. Nearly all of these uses
are by judges who assert that they know the reason for the rule they were applying in a particular case. They appear to agree with Oliver Wendell Holmes that "[ilt is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past." OLIVER W. HOLMES, COLLE TED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
63 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1994).
64 The legislative history provides that "[c]reditors can no longer independently contact
debtors to encourage them to reaffirm debts because such contact is prohibited by the Code." S.
REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1983).
65 As a private practitioner representing consumer debtors in the first year Bankruptcy Code
§ 362(a)(6) was effective, I routinely received requests for reaffirmation from secured creditors'
attorneys. In their landmark study of consumer bankruptcy cases, Warren and Westbrook
found evidence highly inconsistent with the view that debtors sought out their creditors for
reaffirmation. The debtor who reaffirmed an agreement to pay for four tires on a car that
had already been repossessed, the dozens of reaffirmations in one city to a particular department store and no reaffirmation to any other similar store, and other such episodes
suggested to us that creditors contact their debtors for reaffirmations.
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, TEACHER'S MANUAL, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 116 (2d ed. 1991).
66 See, e.g., In re Brown, 851 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1988) (credit union did not violate stay by
BLACKSTONE,

sending a letter to debtor stating that future services would be denied unless debtor reaffirmed);

In re Murray, 89 B.R. 533 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (a mildly worded letter from creditor's counsel
to debtor's counsel stating creditor's intention to foreclose unless debtor reaffirmed the debt did
not violate the automatic stay).
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ble, the provision does not seem to cause readers any confusion.67
The reason for the rule seems to flow from the context, the manner in
the bankruptcy system operates, or some combination of the
which
68
two.

One does not know the reason for a rule of law as a result of
learning it along with the rule. 69 Probably few bankruptcy experts
have ever noticed that Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(6) literally bars
creditors from contacting their debtors to seek a reaffirmation, let
alone memorized a reason for the provision. Yet, were it brought to
their attention, nearly all would derive the same conclusion: the statute does not bar a single polite contact by a secured creditor and there
would be no point in arguing to the court that it does. Law students
not yet exposed to the shared mental model or the realities of system
operation often draw the contrary conclusion: once a bankruptcy case
is filed, there is nothing the secured creditor can do to obtain a reaffirmation. 70 What this demonstrates is that the reason for this rule is
found not in another rule, in legislative history, or any other articuparts of the
lated source. It is found in the relationships among the
71
lawyer's working-that is, functional-mental model.
Conceiving of law as a mental model in lawyers' heads suggests
three characteristics relevant to understanding its function. First, the
law in lawyers' heads will be both different from and simpler than
written law. 72 We know that it must be different because much of it is
67 while this provision has been in effect, several "technical amendment" bills have been
enacted by Congress to correct errors in the Bankruptcy Code. Apparently, the wording of
Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(6) has not been considered an error.
68 For a conclusion so obvious, it is remarkably difficult to specify the reason. The existence
of a reaffirmation procedure in Bankruptcy Code § 524(c) certainly implies that reaffirmations
are contemplated. But the intent could have been to rely on debtor-initiated reaffirmations.
The probable explanation is that reaffirmations can only be accomplished before discharge. See
Bankruptcy Code § 524(c)(1) (1994). Without prompting from creditors, debtors who would
benefit from reaffirmation might miss the deadline.
69 Blackstone suggests that one might be unable to know the reason for the rule until the
rule is encroached upon. He states (supposedly relating an ancient observation of British Law)
"that whenever a standing rule of law, of which the reason perhaps could not be remembered or
discerned, hath been wantonly broke in upon by statutes or new resolutions, the wisdom of the
rule hath in the end appeared from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation." 1
WILLIAM BLACKSrONE, COMMENTARIES *70.

70 This statement is based on numerous class discussions of a hypothetical that raises the
issue. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 65, at 295-96 (stating the hypothetical in problem 20.4).
71 Minsky's "bridge definition" is a definition that bridges highly general "purposeful definitions" and specific "structural definitions" in the human mind. By connecting the two kinds of
definitions of a chair, for example, the bridge definition renders the concept of a chair adjustable
to context and therefore functional. See MiNsKY, supra note 45, at 131.
72 This proposition might be tested empirically by presenting the facts of cases to lawyers
who are members of the community and to a control group that has full access to the written law
but not to the model. The analyses of community lawyers should be more similar to those of
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not expressed verbally. We know it is simpler because the human
mind is incapable of ingesting and storing the massive detail that has
collected in our law libraries. The need for efficiency that compensates for the limitations of human memory underlies much of the theory of cognitive systems. 73 Cognitive systems constantly revise and
generalize to represent the world with a more effective combination of
accuracy and efficiency. 74 To illustrate, a lawyer whose practice will
be affected by a court opinion may read it in its entirety, but more
likely will read only a short summary of it in advance sheets or digests.
If the written opinion seems to accord with the lawyer's mental model,
the lawyer likely will consider it uninteresting. If the written opinion
conflicts with the lawyer's mental model, the lawyer will analyze the
conflict and determine how to incorporate this new information into
the model. 75 To achieve cognitive efficiency, the lawyer may simplify
it to what amounts to a single, simple sentence: "This case stands for
the proposition that. .. ."76 Because many written opinions are expressed such that, when read literally, they are unlikely to apply to
any significant number of future cases, the process of incorporation
may include generalization on the case by analogy. In both respects,
the process of incorporation of the written opinion into the lawyer's
77
mental model distorts the opinion.
Second, errors can exist and persist in mental models, including
both mapping errors and internal inconsistencies. 78 Much of the operother community lawyers than to those of the control group, and the analyses of community
lawyers should employ fewer distinctions.
73 See, e.g., HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 45, at 31 ("In general, the cognitive system will
attempt to construct various simplified models adequate for achieving certain goals. This can be
accomplished by aggregating environmental states and system outputs into useful categories and
ignoring details irrelevant to the purposes of the model.").
74 See, e.g., id. at 36 ("The need for more accurate prediction favors the addition of further
specialized rules, whereas the need for efficient prediction favors the addition of general rules to
replace a larger number of specialized rules.").
75 The lawyer may work with the lawyer's community in deciding what adjustment to make.
See infra subpart I.D.
76 Lawyers and judges commonly speak of "points of law" even though there seems to be
nothing in the logic of written law that naturally would reduce it to points. Marjorie Murphy
deserves credit for this insight.
77 West keynotes are a system, popular among lawyers, that facilitates both aspects of this
process. Though marketed as a way of deciding which cases to read, it is routinely used as a way
of avoiding the necessity to read cases. Other publications include only summaries of the cases.
See, e.g., BANKRuPTcY LAW REPORTER (BNA).
78 Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, 47 KYKLos 3, 25-26 (1994) (discussing examples and some of the literature); ROBERT
NOZICK, THm NATURE OF RATIONALIY 75-78 (1993) (explaining the benefits individuals obtain
from maintaining inconsistent beliefs). For an interesting argument that all models of reality,
though not necessarily inconsistent, are incomplete, see GERALD M. WEImERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS TImNKtNG 110-22 (1975).
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ation of mental models is subconscious, 79 so the person in whose mind
the model exists can examine and correct it only indirectly.80
This second characteristic gives rise to a third. Mental models
can be resistant to change by written law. Most obviously, the person
in whose mind the model exists must be aware of written law that
would change it before that law can have any effect.8 1 Less obviously,
because mental models may represent law nonverbally and operate
largely subconsciously, a person may be exposed to law that conflicts
with the person's mental model without the person recognizing the
conflict. At a minimum, some event must highlight the conflict for
change to occur. The new information then must be integrated into
the model through a process of revision.
These characteristics of mental models of law-simplicity, error,
and resistance to correction-suggest that the promulgators of new
written law should concern themselves not just with the content of the
law, but also with the effectiveness of its communication.8 2 Laws impact legal outcomes to widely differing degrees.8 3 When a law fails to
79 See, eg., JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 21, at 465 ("Although there is much that you can be
aware of, there is also much that is permanently unavailable to you. Indeed, you can never be
completely conscious of how you exercise any mental skill. Even in the most deliberate of tasks,
such as the deduction of a conclusion, you are not aware of how you carded out each step in the
process.").
80 The process for determining errors in one's own mental model is, in essence, to generate
conclusions from the model, compare the conclusions with data generated externally, and note
inconsistencies.
81 The volume of written law has exploded to the point where an awareness of all of it is
impossible. See, eg., PHTiI' K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF CoMMoN SENSE 25 (1994) (noting that
Federal Register increased from 15,000 pages in the final year of John Kennedy's presidency to
over 70,000 pages in the last year of George Bush's presidency). Computers have made it possible to produce binding law far more rapidly than human beings can read, resulting in substantial
amounts of law that have never been read by anyone. For example, most employee health and
pension plans are machine-produced documents intended to be identical to the form, except as
modified by the drafter for the particular client. The drafter may not read the plan because the
drafter is confident in its method of preparation. The employer may not read boilerplate provisions of the plan because the employer considers them the responsibility of the drafter. Employees may be given only nonbinding summaries of the plan, and not even have access to the plan
itself. The same phenomena may be occurring with regard to government regulations, producing
a new strategic environment with unpredictable consequences. See Colin S.Diver, The Optimal
Precisionof AdministrativeRules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (fashioning a "standard for standards"
for administrative rules); Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integrationin the Evolution
of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEo. LJ.2407, 2428-38
(1995) (describing the complexity and obscurity of modem environmental law); Peter H. Schuck,
Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE LJ.1 (1992).
82 The dissemination to which I refer is within the legal community. Galanter has noted the
overwhelming importance of communication of the actions of courts to the broader community.
Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms, in AccEss TO Jus'ncE AND THE WELFARE STATE 157-61
(Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1981).
83 See, e.g., THm IMPAct OF SUPREME COURT DEcisIONS (Theodore L. Becker ed., 1969)

(assessing the practical consequences of decisions of the United States Supreme Court).
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have impact, commentators are quick to assume conscious resistance.
But the explanation may be nothing more than a failure on the part of
the lawmaker to make its point clearly and concisely. The danger of
such failure explains why a legislature would specify a new crime that
is entirely encompassed within the definition of a previously specified
crime84 and why vivid legislative history would have impact even if the
formal rules for statutory interpretation ascribe to it no weight
whatsoever.
D. Sharing Mental Models of Law
Most lawyers work in communities. Often these communities are
geographically local, but communities may be based on the subject
matter with which the lawyers deal or the forum in which they work.
Community results from more frequent interaction among the lawyers
in a particular population than with lawyers outside the population.
Examples of these communities would include lawyers processing the
bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly held companies in nationwide practices,8 5 lawyers doing transactional real estate work in
Gainesville, Florida, or lawyers participating in the revision of Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Most of these communities are
loosely defined in the sense that appropriately licensed outsiders can
participate in the work, but more central members of the communities
dominate. Not all lawyers work in communities of these kinds. A
criminal defense attorney with a national practice might encounter the
same judge or opponent only rarely. The lawyer would continually
encounter communities, but be a member of none of them. The theory I propose here would apply to such a lawyer only by suggesting
written law as relatively ad hoc and
that the lawyer will experience the
fraught with misunderstanding. 86
84 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, An Introduction to the Kentucky Penal Code: A Critique of
Pure Reason?, 61 Ky. L.J. 624, 635-39 (1973) (discussing the problem of legislation creating new

crimes entirely encompassed by the definitions of existing crimes); Rosenn, supranote 9, at 530
("Brazilians commonly refer to laws in much the same manner as one refers to vaccinations.
There are those which take, and those which do not.").
85 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 40 and accompanying text.

86 Commentators link the decline in "civility" in the legal profession to the decline in communities. See, e.g., Charles H. Wilson, Planes, Trains and... Civility, 76 A.B.A. J. 77,77-78 (Jan.

1990) (blaming the lack of civility in part on lawyers who maintain national practices and "have
no roots in the communities in which they occasionally practice"). Those commentators assert as
the operative fact that lawyers fail to practice civility because they do not expect to encounter
today's adversaries tomorrow. But part of the problem may simply be the difficulty of communicating across legal cultures. When a lawyer from outside the culture enters a case, the efficiency
of case processing can be expected to decline. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, DEEP IN My

HEART 55-56 (1966) (describing a case in which an out-of-town civil rights lawyer defended a
charge of breach of the peace by challenging the jury panel for racial bias).
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The lawyers within a community forge and share a mental model
of the community's work. 87 That shared mental model includes representations of law, appropriate ways of interpreting events or processing cases, and other kinds of knowledge. 88 Sharing a mental model
increases the efficiency with which the community processes cases by
facilitating communication among its existing members and speeding
the socialization of new members. 89 Members of the community are,
of course, free to maintain private models in addition to the shared
model in their minds. By doing so, they may gain strategic advantage, 90 but that may require effort unwarranted by the return. Law is,
at bottom, the formulation of consensus. Propositions are true when
the relevant community agrees that they are true. In such an environment, there is great advantage in seeing things the way others do, and
lawyers invest heavily in that skill. The easiest way to get along is to
see things as other members of the community see them.
The process of incorporating written opinions into the shared
mental model is typically interactive within the community. In conversation, written commentary, and continuing legal education sessions, lawyers discuss what the opinion or statute "means" and
eventually arrive at something of a consensus. 91 The process of incorporation has both distorted the opinion or statute and altered the
shared mental model. But the model nevertheless remains essentially
the same from the mind of one member of the community to another,
because each has made the same adjustment.92
87 For an introduction to the concept of shared mental models and their use in institutional
economics, see Denzau & North, supra note 78, at 4 ("Some types of mental models are shared
intersubjectively. If different individuals have similar models they are able to better communicate and share their learning.... But the social aspects of these models are of crucial importance in human society, and these cultural links are only now being explored in this literature.").
The shared mental models described here are more specific in their content than what Bourdieu
describes as habitus. See Richard Terdiman, The Forceof Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, Translators Introduction,38 HASTrGS L.J. 805, 811 (1987) (defining "habitus" as "the
habitual, patterned ways of understanding, judging, and acting which arise from our particular
position as members of one or several social 'fields,' and from our particular trajectory in the
social structure"). The shared mental models are principally beliefs as to what the law requires
in specific instances.
88 Singer emphasizes "orientation of thought" as an element of the type of knowledge from
which lawyers and judges construct their legal reality. The orientation results from concepts
such as the corporation as a private entity or the employee as someone other than the owner.
See Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1984).
89 See Denzau & North, supra note 78, at 18 ("[The shared mental model] provides those
who share it... with a set of concepts and language which makes communication easier."); infra
note 217.
90 Private mental models may enable them to identify situations in which the written law will
strongly support a challenge to the shared mental model. See infra subpart III.A.
91 Judges frequently discuss cases with law clerks, in part to recheck and adjust their understanding. In these sessions, judges and clerks forge shared mental models.
92 See supra note 65.
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The shared mental model includes significant amounts of "law"
neither included in, nor derived from, written law.93 These are the
"rules of thumb" that seem to arise spontaneously and supplant the
exercise of discretion in the mass processing of cases. Courts processing substantial numbers of cases are incapable of considering cases on
a case-by-case basis. Where the appellate courts mandate such treatment, lawyers or lower court judges who are processing significant
numbers of similar cases quickly develop shortcuts. 94 Rules of thumb
such as those described in Part I.A. are ubiquitous in the processing of
consumer bankruptcy cases. These rules of thumb are not simply derivative of written law. The rule of thumb adopted may be contrary to
written law, as where a bankruptcy judge routinely approves all fee
applications in the absence of objection, or fixes a top limit on hourly
rates that can be exceeded only with a great deal of hassle. 95 Eventually such rules of thumb may themselves become law, as occurred
when Congress required that the states adopt guidelines for fixing the
levels of child support96 and when courts became confident enough of
the rules of thumb they were using to distinguish true leases from secured transactions to include them in written opinions. 97 But such
rules often persist over long periods of time without formal recognition, and despite contrary law. 98
93 See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Professional Construction of Interpretive Theory: The
Legal Profession and Statutory Interpretation 38 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (showing with the example of section 92 of the National Bank Act, that "there can be
shared agreement about legal meaning that arises apart from and indeed despite statutory text").
94 This proposition could be tested by interviewing lawyers and judges who are processing
substantial numbers of cases for which case-by-case processing is required. The theory predicts
that those lawyers and judges will, after processing a significant number of cases, be able to state
the rules by which they are making decisions. They will not collect or consider facts irrelevant to
determination under those rules. See, e.g., Blasi, infra note 146 (describing practice in the landlord-tenant court in Washington, D.C. by which appearing tenants were asked "Do you owe the
rent?" as soon as their cases were called and "[o]nly those tenants responding with an unequivocal 'No' were ever allowed to reach the front of the courtroom").
95 Bankruptcy Judge Leif Clark follows the practice of holding a hearing to scrutinize any fee
application that exceeds $250 per hour. He approves lesser rates without hearings. As a result,
attorneys who practice before him generally apply for fees at rates not exceeding $250 per hour.
The effect is essentially to limit fees to $250 per hour, even though bankruptcy judges have no
authority to impose a top dollar limit on fees. Judge Clark's rule of thumb is contrary to written
law. See In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he establishment of a maximum
amount for attorney's fee awards resembles the practice of the courts under the pre-Code Bankruptcy Act, when economy of the debtor's estate was a paramount concern. This notion that
economy of the estate should govern the award of attorney's fees was expressly repudiated by
the Code.").
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1994).
97 See Corinne Cooper, Identifying a PersonalProperty Lease Under the UCC, 49 Omo ST.
L.J. 195 (1988) (showing that two of the three tests developed by the courts generate the wrong
results in some cases).
98 See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 9 (discussing autonomous law made by Gypsies that
conflicts in some respects with law made by the state, yet appears to persist indefinitely).
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The shared mental model of law, like the private mental model of
law and the written law, 99 is principally a set of condition-action rules.
The rules specify that if particular conditions exist, particular actions
should be taken. The community that shares the model is a production system in which the input consists of problems of a legal nature,
the situs is the courtroom, the office, or anywhere else members of the
community interact, 100 and the output is legal outcomes.' 0 ' From
community to community, the shared mental model interacts with the
written law to varying degrees.' 0 2 It does not, however, include the
written law. It is more useful to think of the model as competing with
the written law for control of case outcomes. 103
In this competition, the shared mental model has three critical
advantages over written law. First, as lawyers process cases in the
courtroom, the conference room, or alone in their own offices, the
shared mental model is constantly and immediately available to them.
To access the complexity of the written law, even in a superficial manner, requires minutes; to derive from it a definitive answer to even the
narrowest question typically requires hours of work. Second, even if
there is written law on a particular point, the parties are unlikely to
discover it if it is not part of the mental model of at least one of them.

99 The idea that all legal rules can be reconstituted as if-then logical propositions without
altering their meaning originated with Layman Allen. It is the foundation of the process of
"normalization" of statutes. Normalization is a process that eliminates structural ambiguity from
statutes. See Layman E. Allen & C. Rudy Engholm, Normalized Legal Drafting and the Query
Method, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 380, 402-03 (1978) (describing normalized statutes as if-then statements); Grayfred B. Gray, Reducing UnintendedAmbiguity in Statutes:An Introduction to Normalization of Statutory Drafting, 54 TENN. L. REV. 433 (1987) (providing examples of statutes
expressed as if-then statements).
100 See Galanter, supra note 82, at 147.
101 Thus viewed, the legal system is closely analogous to cognitive systems such as the human
mind or an expert computer system. See, eg., HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 45. at 14-15 ("Condition-action rules underlie much important work in artificial intelligence, including problem solvers ... and most expert systems.... [T]he activity of a rule based system (or productionsystem)
can be described in terms of a cycle with three steps: (1) matching facts against rules to determine which rules have their conditions satisfied; (2) selecting a subset (not necessarily a proper
subset) of the matched rules to be executed, or 'fired'; and (3) firing the selected rules to take
the specified actions."). I do not intend to assert, however, that this relationship between the
functioning of the legal community and the human mind is anything more than an analogy.
Shared mental models would not lose their significance if they were shown to be social rather
than cognitive phenomena.
102 Resort to written law is more common in practices where the importance of the issues and
the wealth of the parties are sufficiently high to support it. Because unanswered arguments are
highly persuasive, resort by one side to the written law forces resort by the other. In high stakes
corporate practice, the mental model itself calls for resort to written law on the "important"
issues in every case.
103 written law may trump in the case of an appeal outside the community, but that is a rare
occurrence. See infra note 159.
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The model typically presents the starting point for research. 10 4 Even
when one party discovers written law, it may be difficult for that party
to demonstrate its relevance in argumentation. For example, the case
disposition called for by the shared mental model initially may have
been the product of a long chain of reasoning. Once that disposition
became part of the model, the chain of reasoning may have been forgotten. The relevance of written law that breaks a link in the forgotten chain may not be easily apparent. Anyone who has attempted to
bring a new idea into a group satisfied already with a prior, highly
integrated view of the world should find this point easy to understand.
Third, basic aspects of the written law have already been incorporated
into the shared mental model. In circumstances where members of
the community feel the need to access written law not yet so incorporated to dispose of a matter, the written law is likely to be indeterminate, making resort to it relatively unproductive. 05 If the written law
calls, as it frequently does, for the exercise of discretion, it will be
trumped by the disposition called for in the shared mental model.10 6
This concept of shared mental models makes it possible to account for the differences in legal outcomes between communities
noted in subpart A. Law is necessarily simplified and distorted in the
process of incorporation into a shared mental model. The process of
simplification and distortion may take different directions in different
communities, but must occur in all. While continued interaction between the shared mental model and the written law will tend to "correct" the model, the correction is necessarily incomplete. 107 The
result, in the language of institutional economics, is that the development of shared mental models is "path dependent." That is, what
model prevails in a community at any given time is largely a product
of historical events peculiar to the community.' 08
104 For example, in 1993, a small software company sold Revlon a computer program for
inventory and distribution control. When Revlon failed to pay for the program, the software
company hacked into the system and disabled it. That action might be defensible on the theory
that the software company had the right to "render equipment unusable.., on the debtor's
premises." U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. However, unless their mental model suggested such a defense,
lawyers for the software company would be unlikely to discover it through research.
105 This proposition could be tested by observing a community processing cases and asking
members, before they resort to written law, to specify the issue, and asking them, after they
resort to written law, whether the written law resolved the issue. The proposition suggests that
written law will tend to have its greatest impact when a party takes the issue outside the community for resolution, as often happens when a party appeals.
106 I have referred to the informal rules requiring such dispositions as "rules of thumb."
107 See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
108 To say that an outcome is path dependent is to say that it lacks inevitability, that is, the
outcome depends on the path followed to reach it. The theory of path dependency challenges
the basic assumption of classical economics that systems move toward inevitable equilibria. See,
e.g., M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY 17-18, 37, 50, 255 (1992) (asserting that the concept
of equilibrium is central to neoclassical economics). While the lack of inevitability of our institu-
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The law in shared mental models is more determinate than the
written law. 10 9 The shared mental model is forged in the context of
case disposition, 110 typically in the trial court, in settlement discussions, and in deal making."' Cases repeat, so that even if participants
in the process attempt to lie to themselves or each other about what
they are doing, the truth soon becomes apparent. The written law, by
contrast, is promulgated largely by appellate courts. Their primary focus is on expounding law. They need only dispose of the issue before
them, not even the entire case and certainly no other cases, making it
easy for them to pass the buck." 2 Cases do not repeat with sufficient
frequency to embarrass them for empty utterances in prior cases, or to
show a pattern in their actual dispositions.
Another factor promoting determinacy is that cognitive systems
have difficulty representing indeterminacies. This is particularly true
when the model is affected by more than one indeterminacy at the
same time." 3 The most effective response for the modeler may be to
construct a determinate model based on plausible assumptions." 4 In
the crush of case processing, such tentative determinacies are easily
converted into permanent ones, as occurs when broad discretion resolves into a rigid "rule of thumb."1' 5 This more determinate nature
of shared mental models forms the basis for the theory of legal strategy I present in the next two Parts.
tions and forms of social organization seem obvious to most people, it is far from obvious to a
neoclassical economist. Id. at 50 ("[Nleoclassical theory, if really taken seriously, says that history is irrelevant."). A neoclassical economist views economic forces as compelling institutions
and forms of social organization toward an equilibrium at which maximum efficiency would be
achieved. Id. at 34-35. Regardless of the particular path by which the economy proceeds, given
time it would reach the same equilibrium. See eg., Denzau & North, supra note 78, at 27 ("The
presence of learning creates path-dependence in ideas and ideologies and then in institutions.").
109 The empirical test proposed supra note 72 could be used for this proposition as well.
110 This theoretical framework is similar to the one presented by Stanley Fish. See Stanley
Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN.L. REv. 1325, 1327-30 (1984) (attributing agreement on what a rule
"is" to the constraints of the context in which it is applied because "knowledge informs rules
rather than follows from them"). Fish nevertheless insists on seeing the processing of cases as an
interpretation of the "text" of the written law. But the link back to written law is inappropriate
when, as is usually the case, the lawyers applying the law neither know nor consult the "text"
they supposedly are "interpreting." By insisting, Fish misses the largely independent nature of
the law in lawyer's heads.
111 Although appellate court lawyers often practice in communities and forge shared mental
models, those models deal only with the matters those communities address repeatedly. The
most prominent is appellate procedure. As to the merits of particular cases, their mental models
are likely to be empty.
112 See, eg., the discussion of Johnson v. Home State Bank, infra note 175 and accompanying
text.
113 JOHNSON-LAMD, supra note 21, at 408 (stating as "[t]he principle of economy in models"
that "[a] description of a single state of affairs is represented by a single mental model even if the
description is incomplete or indeterminate").
114 Id.
115 See

supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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VULNERABILITY TO STRATEGIC MANIPULATION

In what should prove to be a seminal article, Weyrauch and Bell
recently presented a theory of the role legal strategy plays in accommodating autonomously generated informal law to a system of statemade law that purports to be exclusive.116 They list interpretation, the
exercise of discretion, and innuendos "hard to refute and impossible
to review" as strategies that introduce informal law into legal decisionmaking." 7 Strategies of all these types appear to be operating in
the interface between shared mental models of law and formal, written law. The remainder of this discussion is, however, limited to a
particular kind of legal strategy-altering one's conduct to gain the
benefit of determinate rules.
Law is by nature a set of condition-action rules. 118 That is, the
system ostensibly stands ready to take particular action when certain
conditions are met. The mental models that communities use to process cases tend to accept the facts of the cases as given and, as described in the previous Part, to process the cases determinatively. The
effect is that the model is vulnerable to strategic manipulation of those
facts. 119
Any change in conduct that the legal system intends to reward or
inadvertently encourages fits within this definition of strategy.120 For
example, if an insolvent debtor favors one of its unsecured creditors
over others by granting a security interest, the system intentionally
allows the disfavored creditors strategically to file an involuntary
bankruptcy petition against the debtor.121 One effect is to enable the
116 See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 9, at 382-85.
117 Id. at 383 (arguing that strategies "permeate the law ... and cannot be eliminated").
118 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
119 As decisionmakers become aware of strategic manipulation of the facts of the cases that
come before them, their tendency to accept them as given may decline. For example, provisions
of Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code require that debtors pay all of their disposable income to
unsecured creditors. The requirement is, however, vulnerable to the debtor strategy of buying
expensive consumer goods on secured credit before filing and proposing a plan that devotes the
bulk of the debtor's disposable income to payment of this new debt. The effect is to avoid the
necessity of making payments to unsecured creditors. As courts became aware of this strategy,
they began to inquire into such prepetition purchases and employ the "good faith filing" doctrine to combat it. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018, 1021-22 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (refusing to confirm a Chapter 13 plan because the debtor sold the less expensive of two cars before
bankruptcy and kept the more expensive one).
120 The creators of a law-related system are likely to have had a wide variety of intentions.
Some readers may be skeptical of any theory that regards such a system as intending anything in
particular. Though I share that skepticism, I nevertheless choose to treat law-related systems as
goal-seeking. Only by glossing over the many subtle differences in intention that go into the
making of a law-related system is it possible to make sense of such a system. Triantis and I
elaborate on this point in Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and CanadianReorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARv. IrNr'L
L.J. 267, 269-72 (1994).
121 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
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bankruptcy trustee to avoid the preferential grant and distribute the
value pro-rata among all unsecured creditors of the debtor. 122 Because the system intends that disfavored creditors file involuntary
bankruptcy petitions to set aside preferences, those who do so are engaged in "system-intended" strategy.
Systems intended to encourage one strategy may inadvertently
encourage others. To continue with the same example, instead of filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition, the disfavored creditors may
seek preferential treatment for themselves by threatening to fie an
involuntary bankruptcy petition and offering to settle the threat with
the debtor or the favored creditor. This strategy is system-unintended
because, if it succeeds, the strategist gets more than a pro-rata share of
the distribution. Practitioners are generally aware that the strategy is
available, 123 and presumably they use it when it is in the interests of
their clients. The system could have countered this strategy by
prohibiting the settlement, as the system did with regard to settlement
of objections to discharge in a roughly analogous situation. 24 But the
involuntary threaten-and-settle strategy would be more difficult to
eradicate than the discharge object-and-settle strategy; the former occurs in the absence of a bankruptcy case, so there is no court readily
available to enforce any prohibition Congress might enact. In any
event, this example illustrates that system-unintended strategies can
persist for extended periods without provoking corrective action.
Systems of law embedded in shared mental models are vulnerable
to manipulation by system-unintended strategy. 125 Participants can
122 See, e.g., LYNN- M. LoPuciu, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKmuPrcy PROCEEDINGS

§ 2.8 (2d ed. 1991); Lawrence Ponoroff, Involuntary Bankruptcy and the Bona Fides of a Bona
Fide Dispute, 65 IND. Li. 315, 317 n.15 (1990) ("The circumstance most frequently motivating
involuntary filings is the making by the debtor of a large, preferential transfer of property to a
single creditor, resulting in a net depletion of assets available to satisfy the claims of remaining
creditors.").
123 I first wrote about the strategy in 1985, see LYNN M. LoPucia, STRATEGIES FOR CREDIToRS IN BANRupTcy PROCEEDINGS § 2.14.4 (1st ed. 1985), thinking that its exposure would

lead to remedial action, id. at xxx. It has not.
124 See Bankruptcy Rule 7041, providing that dismissal of an adversary proceeding that raises
an objection to discharge must be "on order of the court containing terms and conditions which
the court deems proper." 11 U.S.C. app. Rule 7041 (1994). The avowed purpose of this rule is to
assure that the plaintiff has not received anything in settlement of the case. See id. Rule 7041
advisory committee's note; In re Moore, 50 B.R. 661 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (refusing to approve compromise where plaintiff dropped suit in exchange for settlement of claim).
125 In an indeterminate legal system, system-unintended strategies would be ineffective. With
the freedom to do what they wanted in individual cases, judges would reward system-intended
strategies and thwart system-unintended ones. As Atiyah put it, in attempting to explain why
Holmes's "bad man" theory of law never took off, "judges do not like bad men." P.S. Atiyah,
The Legacy of Holmes Through English Eyes, 63 B.U. L. REv. 341, 369 (1983). Atiyah's implication is that we need not worry about strategic manipulation in the American legal system because judges have sufficient latitude to ensure that system-unintended strategies don't work. Id.
Almost anyone who has practiced law with responsibility at the case strategy level knows that (1)
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reap rewards not intended by designers of the system by meeting the
conditions of condition-action rules. Because the system is determinate, the system has no ability to resist strategy once the case is
brought. The system can only change the rule applicable to future
cases. In its adoption of a determinate form, the law proclaims itself
disinterested in who may use it and for what purpose. Vast areas of
tax planning, estate planning, and the newer discipline of bankruptcy
estate planning 26 are based on this principle.
Recently adopted federal sentencing guidelines provide another
example of the vulnerability of a determinate system of law to strategy. The purpose of the guidelines was to render sentencing outcomes
more determinate; judicial discretion in sentencing was to be "tightly
structured."' 27 Those who adopted the guidelines system were aware
from the outset that the system might be vulnerable to strategic manipulation by prosecutors through plea bargaining:
The Sentencing Reform Act and the guidelines promulgated in response
to its mandate focus on prescribing similar sentences for similar defendants convicted of the same offense. To the extent that the offense for
which the defendant is convicted varies with the discretionary decisions
of individual prosecutors and the same offense conduct does not always
result in the same set of conviction charges, unwarranted disparity may
be reintroduced into the federal criminal justice system. To illustrate,
defendants convicted of bank robbery under similar circumstances may
all receive the same sentence (say, forty-one months), but defendants
who commit bank robbery under similar circumstances may receive different sentences (from probation or six months to forty-one months) if
they are convicted of radically different offenses as a result of the plea
bargaining process. 128
The manipulation of sentences through the manipulation of convictions appears to be a system-unintended strategy. 12 9 Yet, as demon-

strated by empirical
research, the system has not yet been successful
13°
in containing it.
most judges in fact don't like bad men and (2) dislike isn't sufficient to prevent strategic manipulation. See infra section IV.B.1.
126 See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets On the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235
(1995); Kevin A. Shacter, Bankruptcy Estate Planning: Grounds for Denial of Discharge Under
Section 727(a)(2)(A), 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 199 (1990).
127 Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Chargingand BargainingPractices Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 66 S.CAL. L. REv.

501, 501 (1992).
128 Id. at 502 (emphasis in original).
129 Id. at 504-12 (describing the guidelines and the Justice Department's efforts to prevent
strategic manipulation); see Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargainingin the Shadow of the Guidelines,81
CAL. L. REv. 1471 (1993) (arguing that adoption of the guidelines did not reduce disparity in
sentencing but merely shifted the power to create disparity from judges to prosecutors).
130 Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 127, at 534 (showing that guideline circumvention in one
district probably exceeded 25% of the cases). For one district, the authors list ten cases out of a
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Shared mental models of law contain mechanisms for defending
against their manipulation. Like rules of written law, the conditionaction rules of the shared mental model operate at varying levels of
generality. Some of these rules are highly specific and capable of use
in series with other condition-action rules, 131 making them particularly
vulnerable to strategy. Others are more general, providing the system
with an escape from the particular when the latter produce patently
inappropriate results. 132 For example, the Bankruptcy Code specifies
in detail who is eligible to file a bankruptcy petition. 133 But if a clearly
eligible debtor files a petition that is part of a manipulative strategy,
the court can resort to the doctrine that permits dismissal of filings not
made "in good faith." Mental models probably tolerate such inconsistencies to a lesser degree than written law, 134 but such inconsistencies
are sometimes present.
Mental models of law include another type of condition-action
rule rarely seen in written law. This type of rule links fact situations to
legal outcomes in a direct, intuitive way. Its function is to alert system
participants to particular applications of the rules that "prove too
much." The community expects certain case outcomes from the legal
system embedded in its shared mental model, and this overlapping
system of rules and expectations makes it likely to get them. For example, the shared mental model of a community may incorporate a
view of mortgages as reliable, indestructible rights in property, in the
nature of ownership. 135 Such a community will be highly skeptical of
strategies that might void a mortgage for failure to respond to notice
and defend it, even if the rules on which the strategy was based were
explicit. The expectations regarding results limit the effectiveness of
strategies that challenge them and reduce the vulnerability of the system to manipulation.
sample of 111 in which the length of sentences actually given were only 18% of the minimum
sentences required by the guidelines. Id.
131 Holland refers to the use of condition-action rules in such sequences as "coupling." Ho.
LAND ET AL, supranote 45, at 376 ("Coupling is the mechanism that makes rule sequencing and
association possible. A rule R, is coupled to rule R7 if the message specified by R, satisfies at
least one of the conditions of R2.").
132 Probably the most general rules in Anglo-American law are those referred to as equitable
maxims. Examples include the maxims that "equity abhors a forfeiture" and "one who seeks
equity must do equity." Though rarely used as the sole basis for decision, they commonly serve
as make-weights and are available for use in emergencies.
133 See, eg., 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
134 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 88, at 17 ("Even if a specific rule exists that has no exceptions
and that everyone agrees how to apply,... there is always a more general rule or principle that
could plausibly nullify it .... ).
135 See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (ignoring statutory language in the
1978 Bankruptcy Code authorizing the voiding of liens to the extent they exceed the value of the
collateral, based on the supposed pre-Code "rule that liens pass through bankruptcy
unaffected").
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For example, as adopted in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code provided
for the discharge of all debts that arose before the bankruptcy case,
except those specifically excepted from discharge. 13 6 No exception

was made for debts secured by mortgages. 137 Bankruptcy Code
§ 524(a)(2) provided that discharge operated "as an injunction against
the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of
process, or any act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the debtor .... ,1 38
In the case of a debtor entitled to retain homestead property, this language clearly prohibited the holder of a discharged mortgage debt
from attempting to collect from either the debtor or the homestead
after bankruptcy.
Anyone familiar with the system by which home mortgages are
made and enforced would be shocked by this result. To discharge the
debtor from liability for the mortgage debt yields a plausible result,
but to render the mortgage unenforceable against the home after
bankruptcy would destroy something the shared mental model views
as indestructible. Everybody knows that a debtor cannot free his or
her home of a mortgage simply by filing bankruptcy. The interesting
part, for our purposes here, is that they can continue to know 139
that
even when Congress has clearly and explicitly said the opposite.
Such a set of expectations can protect the system from drafting
errors, as it did with regard to Bankruptcy Code § 524(a). But the
process does so by blinding the system to arguments based on the
otherwise valid condition-action rules of the shared mental model.
The process can just as easily blind the system to any argument based
on written law. 140
136 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1978).
137 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1978).
138 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1978) (emphasis added).

139 Six years later, Congress amended Bankruptcy Code § 524(a)(2) to delete the words "or
from property of the debtor" to "clarif[y] that valid liens survive the discharge." BANKRUTrcY
CODE 289 (Collier Pamphlet Edition, Asa S. Herzog & Lawrence P. King eds., 1985). No court
appears to have been confused by Congress's "error" during those six years. See, e.g., In re
Weathers, 15 B.R. 945, 951 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (permitting enforcement of a mortgage
against property of the debtor after discharge because liens "survive discharge"). But see In re
Penrod, 50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a lien had been extinguished by confirmation of
a plan that mentioned the debt but did not state that the debt was secured). The court added

wryly that "like most generalizations about law, the principle that liens pass through bankruptcy
unaffected cannot be taken literally." Id. at 462.

140 For example, in the Galnesville, Florida legal community of the 1970s it was understood
that "punitive damages are hard to get." The understanding gave content to the otherwise
meaningless standard. See, e.g., Arab Termite and Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So.
2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1982) ("A legal basis for punitive damages exists where torts are committed
in an outrageous manner or with fraud, malice, wantonness or oppression."). The understanding
was enforced through a variety of other doctrines, including tight restrictions on what evidence
had to be introduced to provide the basis for an award of punitive damages.
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The dialectic that occurs between largely determinate rules of the
shared mental model of a legal community and the legal community's
expectations as to case outcomes produces a phenomenon that I will
call Whole-Case Realism. The outcome of a case can be predicted
more accurately at the level of the whole case than at the level of the
case-dispositive decisions within the case that supposedly produce the
outcome. Consider, for example, the case of a business that cannot
pay its debts but is nevertheless viable and capable of reorganizing
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The shared mental model
of the bankruptcy reorganization community holds that such a business should be permitted to reorganize, because reorganization will
increase the total wealth available for distribution to the parties to the
case. There are, however, numerous provisions of law that theoretically might prevent the business from doing so. Among them, the
business is not entitled to retain possession of property necessary to
the reorganization unless the business provides "adequate protection"
to any creditor holding a security interest in the property. 141 At the
whole-case level, one can predict that the bankruptcy court will hold
some act within the debtor's power to constitute adequate protection
even in circumstances where one cannot predict what that act might
be.142 One can just as surely predict that the court will not decline to
confirm the plan of reorganization because earlier in the case the proponent of the plan failed to comply with some applicable provision of
the Bankruptcy Code. 143 Professor George Triantis and I have argued
elsewhere that the law of reorganization in both Canada and the
United States is driven not by written law, but by functional imperatives such as these. 144 The shared mental model embodies the community's understanding of what functional imperatives exist.
Whole-Case Realism is not based on an assumption that judges
will commit deliberate treachery or ignore legal doctrine to ensure
expected outcomes. 145 The assumption is only that judges see doc141 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1994).
142 See, e.g., In re BBT, 11 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981) (holding that the value of railroad
cars would increase in the future and that expected future increase provided adequate protection
to an undersecured creditor).
143 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(2) (1994) (providing that "[t]he court shall confirm a plan only if
all of the following requirements are met: ... (2) The proponent of the plan complies with the
applicable provisions of this title.").
144 LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 120, at 304-05.

145 However, they might. For example, in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Supreme
Court ruled that blacks were entitled to admission to law schools on the same basis as whites. In
1949, the University of Florida College of Law denied admission to black applicant Virgil Hawkins. For nearly a decade thereafter, the College of Law and the Florida courts succeeded in
denying blacks admission. They continued in the face of a clear mandate to the contrary from
the Supreme Court of the United States. See Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 414
(1956) (holding that "[T]here is no reason for delay. [Blacks are] entitled to prompt admission
under the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates."). Based on findings of
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trine through the lens of their own mental model of it, that the doctrine itself is largely indeterminate, and that the judges will tend to
perceive it as consistent with functional imperatives and their own expectations. Human cognitive systems tend to generate consistency
even where it does not exist.
Whole-Case Realism acts as a brake on legal strategy, but in doing so renders the system inherently conservative and resistant to
change even through formal law. Statutes intended to change case
outcomes by reversing the law on a particular issue may be ineffective
because Whole-Case Realism causes the parties intended to benefit
from the statutes to lose on other issues. A common strategy for
avoiding the operation of Whole-Case Realism is to attempt to divide
the case between two or more decisionmakers. For example, a party
might seek to have the facts decided by a jury, particular issues by the
trial judge, and other issues on appeal. When available, appeal to a
court outside the community can operate as a kind of "legal arbitrage." A case already decided according to the shared mental model
of one community can be redecided according to the shared mental
model of another. 146
III.

LAWYER-BASED LEGAL CHANGE

Law changes over time. A principal task of legal scholarship has
been to explain how.147 A purely Formalist view asserts that law, as a
command of the sovereign, can be changed only by the sovereign. In

the United States, that ordinarily means the legislatures. Early For"fact" by Circuit Judge J.A. Murphree, the Supreme Court of Florida nevertheless concluded
that admission would "result in great public mischief" and, exercising its self-proclaimed discre-

tion, denied Hawkins admission until such time as Hawkins could show that "his admission can
be accomplished without causing great public mischief." State v. Board of Control, 93 So. 2d

354, 360 (Fla. 1957). Hawkins never managed to obtain admission. Darryl Paulson & Paul
Hawkes, Desegregating the University of Florida Law Schook Virgil Hawkins v. The Florida
Board of Control, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 59, 69 (1984). Thus the Florida legal community

managed to perpetuate a result in accord with their own mental model, despite clear and repeated decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States. See also DAVID C. FREDERICK,
RUGGED JusTicE 83-88 (1994) (discussing corruption of Alaskan district judge by gold miners

who secured his appointment).
146 See, e.g., Gary L. Blasi, Creative Expertise, Law and Slums: A Cognitive/Historical Account of Innovation in Lawyering for Social Change 33-52 (Feb. 1, 1996) (unpublished manu-

script, on file with the author) (contrasting the culture of the local landlord tenant court where
the landmark case, Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970),

originated with the culture of the D.C. Circuit).
147 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structureof Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 1
(1986) (arguing for a dialectic model of legal evolution); Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary
Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238 (1981) (arguing for the use of scientific methods to

search for principles of legal evolution); Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in
Modern Law, 17 LAW & Soc'y REV. 239 (1983) (describing several theories of legal evolution
and attempting to reconcile them).
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malists asserted that judges did not make law, but only found it.148
Legal Realists introduced the idea that judges made law through legal
fictions, such subterfuge as calling a pickaxe a case knife.149 But
within a few decades, Legal Process theorists had persuaded the legal
profession that, although judges did make law, they did it within a
structural framework and with constraints that rendered it democratic
and legitimate. 50 Laws had purposes that could never be completely
captured in the words; the courts were simply discovering the true nature of those purposes under varying circumstances. All of these theories, however, sought to explain changes in the written law and
therefore focused on the work of the legislatures and appellate
courts. 151 In the next subpart, I propose two partial theories of legal
change that occur outside the legislatures and appellate courts and, in
significant ways, beyond their control. 52 They are what Dean Robert
Clark has referred to as "motors" of legal change. 153
A.

Change by Issue Selection

As experienced lawyers work with clients, judges, and other lawyers, they make relatively little use of written law. For every point
they research, they make hundreds of applications of their shared
mental model.' 54 This is especially true of groups repetitively processing routine matters, such as divorces, criminal prosecutions, bankruptcies, or real estate closings. 155 But even when the stakes are high and
148 See, e.g., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hallock, 102 F2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1939) ("It is
the province of the courts to construe, not to make laws."); Pickett v. McGavick, 19 F. Cas. 588,
588 (W.D. Ark. 1876) (No. 11,126) ("[I]f a remedy is wanting under the law, it is not with the
court (which does not make laws, but construes and administers those already made), but with
the law-making power.").
149 The example is Roscoe Pound's. Pound, supra note 26, at 12-14.
150 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN

THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 143 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,

1994) ("Primarily, principles and policies are used and useful as guides to the exercise of a
trained and responsible discretion."). See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New
Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 707, 71131 (1991) (describing the shift in thinking from Formalism to Realism to Legal Process Theory);
id. at 728 (asserting that "Hart and Sacks reconceptualized law as dynamic").
151 But see Clark, supra note 147, at 1253 (recognizing that lawyers play a role in legal change
without specifying how).
152 The theories I present are merely examples of such lawmaking. They are cumulative to
the theory of autonomous lawmaking presented by Weyrauch and Bell. See Weyrauch & Bell,
supra note 9, at 394-95 (describing autonomous lawmaking in a group outside the legal system).
153 Clark, supra note 147, at 1257.
154 The young lawyer starting out is generally encouraged to watch and listen to more experienced lawyers at work and cautioned not to rely too heavily on written law. See Weyrauch &
Bell, supra note 9, at 374 ("A person who comprehends only written law would be inadequately
prepared to practice law.").
155 See, eg., DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING (1984) (discussing plea bar-

gaining between prosecutors and public defenders).
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clients wealthy enough to support a fight, the shared mental models of

the lawyers usually remain sufficiently strong to move matters along
with relatively little reference to the written law. Considering the tremendous number of legal issues potentially involved, there is remarkably little disagreement. 156
Disturbance of the tranquillity of case processing may result from
any of several causes. Lawyers within the community may differ over
a case because their mental models differ in relevant respects. A lawyer from outside the community may initiate the challenge. In extreme cases, it may be obvious that the shared mental model yields an
inappropriate result. Lawyers may introduce norms from the society
at large. The disturbance may come for reasons completely unrelated
to the merits of a case, as when a lawyer scrutinizes a case for any
issue that might obtain delay, impose expense, or punish an opponent
or when an interest group launches a concerted effort to change the
law. 157 It is in these moments, when members of the community decide to challenge the shared mental model, that law takes on its dynamic character. If the challenge is credible, members of the
community resort to written law and engage in intense examination of
some minor aspect of a subject that may or may not yet be represented in their shared mental model. 158 The ultimate challenge is an
appeal outside the community, for example, to an appellate court in
another city, but that route is expensive, often restricted, and rarely
taken. 159
156 For an example of what happens when a lawyer raises every issue that comes to mind, see
VINCENT BUGLIosI, HELTER SKELTER: THm TRUE STORY OF THE MANSON MURDERS 400 (1974)

(expressing the opinion that if Irving Kanarek, a lawyer with a reputation for raising every objection that came to mind, were permitted to represent Charles Manson the trial that was expected
to last four months "could last several years"). Kanarek did represent Manson and made
thousands of objections during the trial. See, e.g., id. at 435-36 ("Reporters keeping track of
Kanarek's objections [to the testimony of Linda Kasabian] gave up on the third day, when the

count passed two hundred."). Nevertheless, Vincent Bugliosi, who was both the prosecutor and
chronicler of the trial, acknowledged that Kanarek was effective. See, eg., id. at 441 ("Given a
choice of defense attorneys [the reporters] quoted Fitzgerald, whose questions were better
phrased. But it was Kanarek, in the midst of his verbosity, who was scoring.").
157 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead" Speculations on the Limits of

Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv.95 (1974) (discussing the use of interest group litigation to
change law).

158 Duncan Kennedy's description of the resort to written law captures the process brilliantly.
Like Franz Kafka's Mr. K, who contemplates his upcoming trial through nearly the entire length
of The Trial, Kennedy's hypothetical liberal judge muses endlessly about the possible implica-

tions of what he might find on his upcoming resort to written law governing a labor protest. The
article ends with Kennedy's judge closer to a final decision on what to do than he is to the books

that will tell him the written law. See Kennedy, supra note 11.
159 For example, during the 12 months ending December 31, 1991, 217,656 cases were commenced in the U.S. District Courts. See ADMINIsTRATrvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATIsTIcs 32 (Dec. 31, 1991). Only 44,465 appeals

were commenced in the U.S. Court of Appeals. Id at 20. The latter figure is 20.4% of the
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Members of the community, particularly the most influential
ones, use their ability to challenge sparingly. 160 To gain efficiency, a
legal community must discourage overly frequent challenges. For that
reason, both formal and informal limits abound. 161 Rules of procedure often require the lawyer who would raise an issue to provide an
extensive memorandum; the effect is to make the challenge expensive.
Pretrial orders require impractical advance notice for the making of a
wide variety of challenges, leaving the courts free later to prohibit or
allow them as the courts see fit. Behavioral norms constrain the
number of objections a lawyer may make during trial and limit the
number of issues that may be raised in a single case. 162 The principal
sanction for ignoring these norms is to be ignored-the decisionmaker
rejects the multitude of challenges without considering any of them.
If the violation is egregious, the sanction can extend beyond the particular case, and the lawyer becomes ineffective in that community. 163
When a credible challenge is carried through to decision, the likelihood that the law of the shared mental model will change or an exception be made is high. This results in part from the generally
indeterminate nature of written law and in part from the very characformer. Corresponding figures for the bankruptcy courts are considerably more dramatic. During the 12 months ending December 31, 1991, 943,987 cases were filed in the bankruptcy courts.
Id. at 11. Only 4362 bankruptcy appeals were commenced in the District Courts during that
year. Id- at 32. The latter figure is only 0.4% of the former. In assessing these figures it is
important to realize that appeals typically address only one or a few issues in the underlying
case. That case may have involved dozens of issues that were actually litigated and thousands of
issues that could have been litigated.
160 This proposition could be tested by ranking the influence of community members who
represent opposing parties in the same case and then counting the number of motions, objections, or other types of challenges they raised during litigation. My theory would predict that
lawyers ranked highly in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory would object less frequently
than those lower ranked.
161 Bugliosi provides several examples of the informal sanctioning of lawyer Irving Kanarek,
a lawyer with a reputation for making too many objections. Bugliosi referred to him in open
court as "a professional obstructionist," BuGuosI, supra note 156, at 400, and another judge
criticized his questions of a witness as "obviously stupid" and "ill-advised," id. at 379. One can
only imagine the effect on Kanarek's clients.
162 This proposition could be tested empirically by asking lawyers whether they raise all objections they think may ultimately prevail and, if not, why not. In commenting on a draft of this
article, Professor Jean Braucher wrote:
In Cincinnati... the [public defenders] ... are extremely reluctant to make use of written
criminal procedure precedents on behalf of their clients; their mental models may erase this
law. The acquiescent attitude of public defenders in turn spills over to the private criminal
defense bar, many of whose members fear being treated as troublemakers by the judges.
This Cincinnati culture came as a real shock to me because I moved here from Seattle,
where the local legal culture expected vigorous use of written law on behalf of criminal
defendants.
Letter from Jean Braucher, Gustavus H. Wald Research Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law to the author 2 (Oct. 20, 1995) (on file with the author).
163 See supra note 147. Walter 0. Weyrauch, Gypsies, A=mi. J. CoMP. L. 53-63 (forthcoming
1996) (describing the implications of informal law for the process of advocacy).
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teristics of the case that caused the lawyer to select it for challenge.
The key to change by issue selection is not that the law may change
where challenged, it is that it will not change where not challenged.
Some decisions represent communicable changes in the judges'
mental models. In those cases, the judges may wish to communicate
the changes to members of the community so they can make the same
alteration in their mental models and efficient processing of cases can
resume. A judge might do that formally, by issuing an opinion, or
informally by explaining the change to the lawyers in an order, in
chambers, or in continuing legal education. Because other decisions,
even decisions that deviate from the shared mental model, will not
require a change in the model, 164 no explanation will be necessary.
One might suppose that changes to the shared mental model of a
legal community that occur in response to exposures to written law
would, over time, conform the mental model to the written law. Such
changes probably do tend to align the mental model more closely with
the written law. But the process is subject to constraints. First, the
cases in which the community is most likely to resort to written law
are the close cases with regard to which the written law is least likely
to be determinate. 165 Second, the cognitive limits of the human mind
prevent the community from conforming the shared mental model to
the far more complex pattern of the written law. The written law can
respond to its own failure by introducing finer and finer distinctions
among fact situations, 166 but the shared mental model must respond
by reorganizing categories at roughly the same level of complexity.
Thus the shared mental model tends not to change from simplistic rule
to true rule, but from one simplistic rule to another. 167 Such wandering probably accounts for the difference in the rules applied to loans
from relatives in Gainesville and Kansas City.168

164 The shared mental model is a blueprint for dealing with future cases. Unless a particular
kind of case is likely to repeat with sufficient frequency, no change in the model is warranted.
Thus lawyers and judges may be surprised by the same aberration more than once.
165 If we spread the universe of cases and issues along a continuum from the most difficult
and uncertain to the easiest and most predictable, resort to written law is most likely to occur
near the difficult end of the continuum. Even if there are, as Schauer asserts, "easy" cases where
law is determinate in a Formalistic sense, see Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL L. REV.
399 (1985), they will tend not to be the cases that cause lawyers to resort to the written law.
166 See, e.g., Duke of Norfolk's Case, 2 Swans. 454, 468; 3 Chan. Cas. 14, 36 (1681) ("Lord
Nottingham said: 'It hath been urged at the bar, where will you stop if you do not stop at Child
and Bayly's case? I answer, I will stop everywhere when an inconvenience appears, nowhere
before'.").
167 This proposition could be tested by the method described supra note 72.
168 See supra subpart I.A.
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B.

Change by Strategic Manipulation

Part II described the vulnerability of shared mental models to
strategic manipulation. While written law can claim to provide unique
treatment appropriate to each case, shared mental models must create
coarse categories and "treat likes alike." Most legal strategy consists
of efforts to qualify a person or situation for inclusion in categories
that trigger desirable condition-action rules. 169 For example, the lawyer for a creditor may attempt to qualify the creditor as a secured
creditor to gain the benefit of the condition-action rule that gives secured creditors priority over other creditors. The strategy can be employed at the time the loan is made, simply by contracting for security
and filing a financing statement in the public records. The strategy
can be employed at the time of collection, by negotiating for a similar
grant of security at that time. 170 In a plausible case, it can be employed at the time of adjudication,
by arguing that earlier events had
171
rendered the creditor secured.
When a strategy is successful, others adopt it and its use spreads.
If the strategy is system-intended, its spread makes the system more
effective in achieving the system's goals. To continue with the example of the secured creditor, the strategy of initially making the loan on
a secured basis and perfecting it by public filing is, with regard to most
kinds of loans, a system-intended strategy. The public filing gives notice to others who contemplate lending to the debtor and facilitates
private ordering.
When system-unintended strategies are successful-that is, when
the step-by-step logic of the strategy overcomes the community's expectation that the outcome was unreachable-they too spread. 172 If
success of the strategy is visible to members of the community, the
community will have to change its expectations regarding outcomes.
That change in expectations may reverberate through other parts of
the system.
This sequence of events is illustrated by the controversy over
"Chapter 20" bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978
gave consumer debtors a choice between liquidation under Chapter 7
and debt adjustment under Chapter 13. For most debtors, the principal advantage of Chapter 7 was the complete absence of any obligation to repay unsecured debt. For many debtors, the principal
advantage of Chapter 13 was that it enabled them to retain their
169 See, eg., Michael J. Powell, ProfessionalInnovation: CorporateLawyers and PrivateLawmaking, 18 LAw & Soc. INQuirY 423 (1993) (describing the development and implementation of
the "poison pill" strategy in corporate takeovers).
170 See LoPucia, supra note 53, § 2.16.3.
171 The variety of cases in which secured or other preferred status is plausible is large. See id
§ 6.6A.
172 See Powell, supra note 169, at 439-46 (describing the spread of the "poison pill" strategy).
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homes while curing arrearages in monthly payments over a reasonable
period of time. The legislative history made clear that the purpose
was to put home-owning debtors to a choice between the two Chapters, and by doing so to encourage the choice to repay unsecured debt
under Chapter 13.173 The initial ambiguity as to whether debtors with
the ability to make some repayment to unsecured creditors had to do
so as the price of Chapter 13 relief was resolved by amendment in
1984. The amendment required Chapter 13 debtors to devote "all of
[their] projected disposable income" during the three-year period of
their plan to payments under the plan. 174 By the end of 1984, it appeared that to save his or her home through bankruptcy, a debtor had
to file under Chapter 13 and pay unsecured creditors what he or she
could, for a period of three years.
Aggressive debtors' lawyers responded with a strategy that became known as "Chapter 20." The debtor first filed for bankruptcy
liquidation under Chapter 7 and discharged the debtor's unsecured
debt. Then the debtor filed under Chapter 13 to cure arrearages on
the debtor's home mortgage in monthly payments. The theory of this
strategy was that the debtor would not have to repay the unsecured
debt in the Chapter 13 case because it had been discharged in the
Chapter 7 case. By purporting to enable any debtor to save the
debtor's house without applying the debtor's disposable income to the
payment of creditors for three years, the Chapter 20 strategy
threatened to prove too much. But the strategists counted on the
strength and clarity of the two rules on which they relied: (1) debtors
are not prohibited from filing sequential cases under Chapters 7 and
13, and (2) a debtor need not pay debts discharged in a prior bankruptcy case.
The bankruptcy courts divided over the effectiveness of this strategy. More than six years after the amendment, a Chapter 20 case
made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. Probably
because of the strength and clarity of the two rules on which the strategy relied, the opponents of the Chapter 20 strategy did not challenge
either. Instead, they found a technical issue that a sympathetic court
might use to defeat the strategy. The issue was whether the home
mortgage was a "claim" repayable under a Chapter 13 plan in light of
173 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 25 (1980) ("Chapter 13 is
designed to induce eligible debtors to repay their just obligations from future income as a means

of avoiding ... liquidating bankruptcy proceedings under chapter 7. The principal statutory
inducements to chapter 13 debtors include... the retention by the debtor of property... during
the extension period. These and other important legal and economic advantages are afforded to
chapter 13 debtors but not to chapter 7 debtors."); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, "Encouraging"
Repayment Under Chapter13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 347 (1981) (arguing against requiring debtors to repay unsecured creditors as the price of Chapter 13 relief).
174 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(A) (1994).
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the fact that it, too, had been discharged in the Chapter 7 case. 175 The
Court held that the mortgage was such a claim. In support of its decision, the Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code expressly prohibited
successive filings of some kinds of cases, without expressly prohibiting
a Chapter 7 followed immediately by a Chapter 13. The opinion
cleared the way for use of the Chapter 20 strategy, at least in appropriate cases. But the Court also noted the existence of the "good
faith" requirement for a Chapter 13 plan, which still might be used to
defeat the Chapter 20 strategy in inappropriate cases. The written law
remained indeterminate.
The theory I present here would predict an empirical finding that
the Supreme Court's opinion made only small changes in the geographical pattern of success and failure of the Chapter 20 strategy.
Despite its apparent success in the Supreme Court, Chapter 20 would
not spread to other districts because the Court had addressed only
issues of law and not the existing pattern of expectations as to case
outcomes. 176 Had the Court instead ruled that a discharged mortgage
was not a claim modifiable in a later Chapter 13 case, my theory
would predict a similarly minor effect on outcomes; indistricts where
Chapter 20 was in accord with the shared mental model, the community would have found another doctrinal peg on which to hang its
hat.177 Fiddling with the written law typically has little effect on legal
178
outcomes.
Assume that the lawyers in a community pressed Chapter 20
cases for the first time and were successful in enabling clients to retain
homes without making any payment to unsecured creditors. Other
lawyers in the community presumably would do the same, and the
amounts paid by Chapter 13 homeowners in the community to unsecured creditors would fall. Members of the community would adjust
their shared mental model to recognize the effectiveness of the strategy. They might also adjust the model to change their expectations
regarding payments to unsecured creditors in consumer bankruptcy

175 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 80 (1991).

176 See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 32, at 533 (noting that "[a]fter Johnson v. Home State
Bank, chapter 20 could also be used to make an end run around an expectation of high percentage repayment of unsecured debts in chapter 13" but that lawyers "may be reluctant to seize
upon this aggressive technique" for "fear [of] annoying local trustees and judges").
177 For example, debtors might have adopted the strategy of waiving discharge of the mortgage debt. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(10), 524(c) (1994). If the courts permitted waiver over the
objection of the mortgage holder, the mortgage debt would remain owing and be a claim in the
later Chapter 13 case.
178 I do not mean to imply that legal outcomes are unchangeable. My point is that change
requires community action at the level of the shared mental model, as opposed to mere legislative or judicial pronouncements. See supra notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
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cases generally. 79 If they did the latter, the change might affect the
levels of repayment to unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 cases not
preceded by Chapter 7s. That is, the lawyers' expectation that debtors
could use Chapter 20 to save their homes without paying unsecured
creditors would be dissonant with the Bankruptcy Code § 1325(b) requiring such repayment under Chapter 13. The community might resolve this dissonance by generally lowering the expectation of
repayment to unsecured creditors. Such a lowering might be accomplished indirectly, for example, by an increased readiness on the part
of bankruptcy judges to accept budgets in which the debtors report no
"disposable income" that would trigger the obligation to make payments to unsecured creditors. The system would experience a ripple
effect as it sought a new equilibrium that incorporated and adjusted to
the Chapter 20 strategy, matched condition-action rules to the new
expectations, and still met the overall system requirement of administrative simplicity.
If Congress or the Court somehow managed later to abolish the
Chapter 20 strategy, it is highly doubtful that the system would return
to its former equilibrium. Reversal would have complex implications
for lawyers and clients who had, in the interim, relied upon the acceptance of Chapter 20.180 Restoration of the mental model accompanying the former equilibrium could be difficult for the simple reason that
no one might recall it.181 Through a process analogous to web effects
in institutional economics, at least some of the effects of the Chapter
20 strategy have become irreversible. 82 Strategy has brought about
change in the law, with only grudging acquiescence by judges.
Strategy-based legal change is not confined to the interstices of
written law. The field of commercial law is replete with examples of
situations where legal strategies have forced the hands of courts or
even legislatures and effected grand-scale change. Lawyers dramatically altered the balance of power in litigation through the invention
179 This second adjustment is problematic because it is possible for the community to adopt a
more complex expectation toward repayment to unsecured creditors: that Chapter 20 debtors
will not repay, but Chapter 13 debtors will. Adoption of this more complex expectation would
be more likely if there were legal or practical limits on a debtor's ability to file Chapter 20 that
might seem to the lawyers to have some policy basis.
180 For example, debtors will have borrowed money and lawyers will have advised clients and
filed bankruptcy cases in an environment where Chapter 20 was the expectation.
181 The mental model knows its own state. That is, it necessarily contains the information
necessary to predict what it will do in any situation. But it does not necessarily know how it
reached that state. Members of the community may have forgotten. Members of the community
may never have been conscious of the changes they were making in their own mental models.
Even if individual members of the community remember how the changes came about, their
advocacy of restoration may seem self-serving to new members of the community who never
experienced the old order.
182 See, e.g., Stuart A. Kauffman, The Evolution of Economic Webs, in Tim ECONOMY AS AN
EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 125 (1988).
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of the contract provision for the payment of attorneys fees and costs
incurred in litigation. Lawyers invented the concept of property
standing as "security" for a debt 8 3 and won grudging acceptance of it
from the courts.' 8 4 Perhaps the greatest tribute to the lawyers' tenacity is the argument of Professor James J. White that the abolition of
security is beyond the power of the law, because creditors and their
lawyers would develop alternative strategies for accomplishing the
same thing.' 8 5
One more example may help to illustrate the possibility of strategy-based change that occurs at a level of generality and importance
that transcends judicial decisionmaking. The example is an ongoing
decline in the ability of unsecured creditors to collect money judgments from encumbered property in the absence of bankruptcy. That
ability is central to the operation of the coercive collection system.
86
Nearly all property of financially distressed debtors is encumbered.
Debtors who find advantage in doing so can easily encumber the rest.
If unsecured creditors cannot recover from encumbered property,
they have no 8legal
remedy by which they can coerce payment from
7
their debtors'1
To date, no statute or court opinion addresses this ability directly. 8 8 In fact, the issue is of such breadth that if any court were to
address it in its totality, that court probably would be vulnerable to a
claim that it had attempted to decide much more than the case before
it. Such broad issues are not the stuff of statutes or opinions. They
are the stuff of shared mental models that tell us how the world works.
183 An apocryphal history of the construction of security from existing legal concepts appears
in LYNN M. LoPucmi & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDrr. A SYSTEMS APPROACH 27-29

(1995).
184 The hostility of the courts to the developing concept of security is recounted in RICHARD
E. SPEIDEL, ROBERT S. SUMMERS, & JAMES J. WH=TE, SECURED TRANSACrONS: TEACHING
MATERIALS 27-35 (1987).

185 James J. White, Efficiency Justificationsfor PersonalProperty Security, 37 VAND. L. REv.
473, 502 (1984) ("It is not clear that Congress would or could enact a law that would successfully
deprive secured creditors-or their proxies under a new system-of priority. It is my thesis that
if Congress indeed were successful in constitutionally abolishing security, then formerly secured
creditors would search for security alternatives.").
186 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1931-38
(1994).
187 Courts order the payment of debts and use their contempt powers to enforce their orders
only in a narrow range of cases. See LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 183, at 20.
188 For recent cases addressing it indirectly, see Security Pacific Bank v. Haines Terminal &
Highway Co., 869 P.2d 156, 158 (Alaska 1994) (stating in dicta that "the trial court properly held
that [the judgment creditor] could not 'attach property that is subject to a security interest when
that security interest is larger than any of the debtor's interests' "); Grocers Supply Co. v. Intercity Inv. Properties, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding a judgment creditor who
did not notify the secured creditor before levying against collateral liable for secured creditor's
damages in recovering the property from the judgment creditor).
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My experience practicing in Gainesville, Florida was under what I
will call the "old" model. 189 Under that model, a judgment creditor
has the right to a writ of execution directing the sheriff to seize the
debtor's property, whether or not encumbered. Seizure of property
results in its sale, subject to the encumbrance. The secured creditor
has the right to foreclose against the property in the hands of the
buyer, but has no right or ability to prevent the execution levy or the
sale. 190 Nor does the debtor, except by paying the judgment debt in
full or commencing a bankruptcy case. Under the old model, the
debtor that wants to continue operating its business outside bankruptcy without paying the judgment debt is at the mercy of its judgment creditor.
I first learned of the competing "new" model in interviews with
lawyers practicing in Madison, Wisconsin in the mid-1980s. With considerable unanimity, the Madison lawyers believed that execution was
an ineffective remedy because a creditor holding a security interest in
property had the right to block execution against the property by so
notifying the sheriff. 191 Because Wisconsin sheriffs generally shared
that belief, it was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The sheriffs refused to
levy, leaving the judgment creditors with no remedy short of a petition
for mandamus. The lawyers might well have doubted that mandamus
would be granted, because the new mental model was shared in the
communities that would process the mandamus case as well. The beliefs of all of these participants combined to produce a single result:
the ineffectiveness of execution. That result was beyond challenge by
judgment creditors. 192
The difference in the practices in those two cities can arguably be
attributed to a difference in law between the two jurisdictions.
Although both models were grounded in provisions of the Uniform
189 By this, I mean to imply only that I encountered it first. Whether the law now moves from
the "old" model to the "new" model may depend on the strategies employed by the lawyers
involved.

190 The basis in law for this claim is found in U.C.C. § 9-311 (1994), which provides that "[t]he
debtor's rights in collateral may be.. . involuntarily transferred (by way of sale ... levy... or
other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any
transfer .... " The purpose of the section is "[t]o make clear that in all security transactions
under this Article, the debtor has an interest (whether legal title or an equity) which ...

his

creditors can reach." U.C.C. § 9-311 cmt. 1.
191 The basis in law for this claim is found in U.C.C. § 9-503 (1994), which provides that "a
secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral." The lawyers recognized the formal limitations that the debt to the secured creditor had to be in default and the
secured creditor might have to feign a desire to exercise its own remedies against the collateral.
The lawyers seemed to presume that these things would be easy for a debtor and secured creditor to accomplish and that, if a judgment creditor took the hostile step of executing, they would
accomplish them.
192 See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (discussing "Whole-Case Realism").
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Commercial Code that were identical in the two states, 193 those provisions had, at the time of my observations, been interpreted differently
by courts of the two states in written opinions. 194 The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin had held that a secured creditor whose debt was not in
default did not have the right to possession of the collateral from a
sheriff who held it pursuant to execution, implying that a secured
creditor whose debt was in default did.1 95 A Florida Court of Appeals
had held the existence of a security interest in property did not exempt the property from forced judicial sale. 196 But neither of the two
opinions was inconsistent with the perfectly reasonable rule laid down
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1988 that (1) a secured
creditor did have the right to possession from the sheriff under U.C.C.
§ 9-503, but (2) only if the secured creditor sought possession to exercise its own remedies against the debtor, not merely to preserve the
debtor's possession. 97 Given that the Florida and Wisconsin opinions
could comfortably coexist in a perfectly reasonable system, their mere
existence does not explain the sharply different shared mental models
98

in the two legal communities.

Against this background, Lincoln Brooks, a lawyer practicing in
Palo Alto, California, developed a strategy that seems to have the
power to determine the future of execution against encumbered property. Brooks represents Silicon Valley high-technology companies in
financial distress. Those companies usually have unsecured debts in
substantial number and amount. Brooks's strategy is directed against
dissenting unsecured creditors who obtain judgments and threaten to
disrupt operations of the company by execution. The conventional
understanding is that dissenting creditors have the right to do so.199
193 See supra notes 190-91.
194 Interpretation may serve as a means of incorporating norms from unwritten law into the
written law. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 9, at 398.
195 First Nat'l Bank of Glendale v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 149 N.W.2d 548, 550-51
(Wis. 1967).
196 Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 204 So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
197 See Frierson v. United Farm Agency, 868 F.2d 302, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1988). A Florida
Court of Appeals later held a secured creditor entitled to reclaim collateral from a sheriff who
had taken it on execution, somewhat disingenuously confining the earlier Florida decision to
cases where the debt owing to the secured creditor was not in default. See Brescher v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 460 So. 2d 464,467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Brescher is perfectly consistent
with the law of Wisconsin as expounded in FirstNationalBank of Glendale, which it cited; if the
Brescher court is to be believed, Brescher effected no change in Florida law.
198 This proposition could be tested by presenting hypothetical fact patterns to lawyers who
are not familiar with the practices of either community, but who have access to the law of all
states, and asking them what results they would predict if the hypotheticals were decided by the
courts of the two states.
199 See, e.g., MARK S. SCARBERRY E AIL, BUsINEss REORGANIZATION IN BANKuRuvrc,

10

(1995) ("Out-of-court workouts are entirely voluntary from the creditors' point of view and require almost unanimous creditor support to succeed. Only creditors who agree to the workout
agreement are bound by it; even if 99 out of 100 creditors agree to it, the one dissenting creditor
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Brooks's strategy is to have his client, a debtor in financial distress
that is about to enter into negotiations with its creditors, grant a security interest in all of the company's assets to all of the company's unsecured creditors. By prearrangement with the Credit Manager's
Association (CMA), a reputable, independent organization of credit
managers, the grant names CMA as trustee on behalf of the unsecured creditors as a group. Neither Brooks nor CMA seeks authority from the unsecured creditors for CMA to act on their behalf.
CMA accepts the grant, usually as secretary to an informally organized committee of creditors and then assists in negotiations with the
debtor for an out-of-court workout. If a judgment creditor attempts
to levy, CMA, in its capacity as a secured creditor, intervenes with the
sheriff to demand return of the property to the debtor.
While the law on the books today is sharply divided as to CMA's
right to block execution, Brooks's strategy presents the secured creditors' side of this issue in the best possible light. The strategy appears
to have been uniformly successful. Brooks reports that judgment
creditors have levied against property protected by these CMA security interests at least fifty times. Each time, CMA has filed a thirdparty claim to the property.2 00 In all but four or five instances, the
judgment creditors have released their levy prior to hearings on the
third-party claims. In the four or five instances in which Municipal or
Superior Courts have decided the third-party claim, they have ruled in
favor of CMA.201 None of these cases has been the subject of an opinion, reported or unreported. So far, the strategy has won Brooks's
clients most of the benefits of a bankruptcy stay or an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, 202 without having to file bankruptcy or make
an assignment. 20 3
can demand full payment and pursue legal remedies. The debtor will typically pay that dissenting creditor to avoid the disruption that would be caused if the dissenter exercised its state law
creditor's rights.").
200 See CAL CiV. PROC. CODE § 720.210 -.230 (West 1995).
201 See, ag., Order Granting Third Party Claim, Alliance Financial Capital, Inc. v. Peripheral
Land, Inc. (No. 080265) (Municipal Court of California, County of Alameda, Apr. 5, 1995)
(granting CMA's third party claim to debtor's money in a bank account in which CMA held a
security interest).
202 In an assignment for the benefit of creditors, a debtor irrevocably assigns all of its property to a trustee, who undertakes to liquidate the property and distributes the proceeds to creditors. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 65, at 175-76. Debtors are sometimes willing to
make such assignments because assignment blocks execution by individual creditors giving the
trustee time to liquidate the property for the most advantageous price. Using Brooks's strategy
instead of an assignment, the debtor can block execution without giving up possession and control of the business or committing to its liquidation.
203 Brooks reports that the "stay" has been effective for as long as 18 months after the grant
of security, in some cases even against post-workout levies. Telephone interview with Lincoln
Brooks, bankruptcy attorney with Brooks and Raub, Palo Alto, California (May 30, 1995).
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Until such a strategy has altered the expectations of a legal community, it would be vulnerable to nullification by act of the legislature
or the ruling of an appellate court. But the expectations of the legal
community may change before the legislature or an appellate court
intervenes. Once the community becomes accustomed to the idea
that a "disgruntled" judgment creditor cannot upset negotiations for
an out-of-court workout and this new balance of power has been absorbed into the shared mental model of the community, the legislature
or court may find it more difficult to overturn. The legislature or
court could establish written law hostile to the strategy, but its intervention might be seen as an attempt to change established law and the
community may confine it narrowly. At that point, the legislature or
court might have to employ considerable skill and effort to effect any
change in outcomes.
Brooks's efforts to collectivize the nonbankruptcy remedies of
unsecured creditors also illustrates the ephemeral nature of legal strategy. Today Brooks's strategy would strike most lawyers as manipulative, but that is only because it threatens to produce a result that
differs from their expectations. 20 4 If he is successful, others will imitate him. Eventually, the results of his strategy will no longer seem
surprising. Then the procedures by which lawyers implement it will
no longer seem strategic. The recruitment of a reputable representative for unsecured creditors, the grant of a security interest to the
creditors at large, and the subsequent appeal to the sheriff not to levy
while negotiations continue will first become routine, then perfunctory. Eventually the written law may dispense with the need for these
"formal vestiges" and instead directly proclaim the outcome: judgment creditors may not levy while the majority of unsecured creditors
are engaged in workout negotiations with a debtor.205 Legal change
brought about through strategic manipulation will seem in retrospect
20 6
to be merely an act of a court or legislature to modernize the law.

204 See SCARBERRY ET AL, supra note 199, at 14 ("Dissenting creditors cannot be bound in a
workout, but they can be bound in chapter 11.").
205 Pound gives examples from both Roman and Anglo-Saxon law of evolutions in which the
law in action first split from the law on the books-perhaps through legal strategy-and the law
on the books was later conformed to the law in action. Pound, supra note 26, at 13-15. Pound
described the process as "legal theory... yield[ing] to the pressure of lay ideas and lay conduct,"
but his examples suggest strategic manipulation. Resort to "a fictitious plea and fictitious ejectment" would have to begin with the pleadings-the strategy of a lawyer-before it could be
adopted by a court. Id.at 14.
206 The process of legal change through strategic manipulation is in many ways analogous to
the process of legal change through the use of legal fictions. Both strategies and fictions seem
manipulative on first use. Both cease to seem so after repeated use, and the eventual elimination of either after it has served its purpose in bringing about a particular change is likely to be
viewed as modernization. See LON L. FuLLER, LEGAL FICnrONS 14-23 (1967).
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IV.

A.

IMPLICATIONS

Explanatory Implications

1. Law as PsychologicalPhenomena.-OliverWendell Holmes,
generally credited as the founder of the Legal Realist movement, posited that law is "what the courts will do in fact. '20 7 Karl Llewellyn, a
leading realist of the 1930s and 1940s, expanded Holmes's definition
to include not only judges, but "officials," a term in which he expressly
included lawyers.20 8 The law expressed in shared mental models bet20 9

ter fits these definitions than the law on the books.
The first implication of shared mental models of law, then, is that
the "law" that drives case outcomes is principally a psychological phenomenon. 210 It exists in human minds, and the process of change occurs in human minds.
operate as limits on its
powerful legal impetus
treatment of "likes" in

The cognitive limits of the human mind will
complexity.2 11 Those limits might explain the
toward the illusion of equality in law and the
a like manner. Every case is different. Why

207 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
208 KARL LlwELLYN, supra note 62, at 12. The full passage reads:
This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is the business of law.
And the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks
or jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. What these officials do about disputes is, to my
mind, the law itself.
IL
209 Shared mental models also better fit these definitions than does the law in action. The law
in action includes outcomes not imposed by officials, making it somewhat different from the law
referred to by Holmes and Llewellyn. See Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 465,466-71 (including within the concept of "contract law in action" sanctions
imposed by trading partners).
210 The idea that law's only real existence is in the minds of participants in the legal system is
a tenet of Scandinavian Legal Realism. See, e.g., KARL OLIVECRONA, LAW As FACr 42-49

(1939) (explaining that laws are "imperative statements about imaginary actions" and that the
written law is merely a way of reminding people about notions that their minds consider only
intermittently). "In reality, the law of a country consists of an immense mass of ideas concerning
human behavior accumulated during centuries through the contributions of innumerable collaborators." Id. at 48. Olivecrona states that "[t]he written text-in itself only figures on paperhas the function of calling up certain notions in the mind of the reader. That is all." Id. at 48; see
also ALF Ross, ON LAw AND JUSICE (1959).
211 The mental model may call for a "look up," as when the members of a legal community
understand that child support is to be set by looking up the dollar amount on a table, and then
perhaps adjusting it in some manner. Such a look up is merely a memory device that supplements the mental model, it is not written law that supplants it. A particular body of law may also
achieve considerable complexity in the minds of a small community expert in it, as occurs in
various areas of tax law. But the tradeoff for that complexity is that the expert community is
fully absorbed with it and has less time to devote to understanding how the law they have mastered relates to the rest of the world. Additionally, legal expertise that goes beyond a certain
level of complexity is of little use because it cannot be communicated to others, which ordinarily
is a prerequisite to application.
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attempt to treat them alike? 212 The reason may be the cognitive efficiency thereby achieved. If one can safely gloss over "minor" differences, such as whether the plaintiff is a widow or a great corporation,
one need maintain only a single mental category rather than a
thousand.
2. The Inevitability of Local Legal Cultures.-The existence of
local legal cultures, all supposedly "governed" by the same written law
but generating markedly different outcomes, is not only possible, but
inevitable. Written law can be applied only through the medium of a
mental model. Most of those models are produced interactively in
local communities. 213 The community's shared mental model does not
exist in complete isolation from the written law; to the contrary, members of the community usually study the written law for useful ideas.
They may confuse it with the shared mental model and be intent on
reproducing it in their own minds. The effort is, however, futile because the written law is too complex. Because the shared mental
model of a given legal community is in no sense a replica of the written law and because communities work to some degree in isolation
from other communities, it is inevitable that they will produce shared
mental models that differ from community to community.214
3. The Facilitationof Communication.-A shared mental model
provides those who share it with a set of concepts and language that
makes communication easier. When speaker and listener have common concepts or features in their mental models, single terms can
stand for substantial pieces of implicit analysis. 215 Discussion can pro212 See Peter Westin, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982) (demonstrating that the legal idea that likes should be treated alike is tautological and arguing that the idea
should be banished from moral and legal discourse). Equality may be defensible as a moral
concept if one considers the entire situations of the persons compared. See generally JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (employing the concept of the least well off in society);
LARRY S. TEMrUN, INEOUALrrY (1993) (discussing the bases for making such comparisons). But

the concept of equality employed expressly in legal decisionmaking does not attempt to consider
the entire situations of the persons involved.
213 The "locality" need not be geographical because the community that processes cases may
be national or even international. What is essential is that members of a community interact
regarding cases with sufficient regularity to forge shared mental models of the process and appropriate outcomes. That can only occur in relatively small communities, where an individual's
mental model can be forced to conform to that of other members through repeated application
and adjustment.
214 See, e.g., The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria:The First TwentyFive Years, 4 AR. INT'L 86, 93-94 (1988) (asserting that diverse trade practices have produced a
"micro" lex mercatoria which differs from place to place); Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 9, at
376-77; Uoo DRAEITA ET AL, BREACH AND ADAPTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CoNTRAcrs 7-29

(1992) (describing the controversial concept that a "lex mercatoria" exists separate from the law
of any of the states involved).
215 See Denzau & North, supra note 78, at 18-20.
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ceed more quickly.21 6 This suggests that in forums where the lawyer-

participants are not members of the same community and therefore
do not have a shared mental model of law, the lawyers will find it
more difficult to communicate and misunderstandings will be more
common. 217 If so, the production and application of shared
mental
21 8
models are essential to the work of the legal profession.

Easy communication comes at a price. Freeing the lawyers from
the necessity to work through the foundations of their arguments in
each case has the side effect of reducing the likelihood that the law-

yers will discover errors in those foundations. 21 9 The community will
be prone to approve unjust outcomes on the mistaken assumption that
they are required by "law." Here, too, the effect is to render the
shared mental model resistant to correction or change.
B. Normative Implications

The theories presented in this Article suggest several changes in
accepted practices. First, strategic analysis of the type proposed by
Oliver Wendell Holmes should be taken seriously. Second, the written law should be simplified. Third, the law in lawyers' heads should
216 The efficiency produced by shared understandings of the complexity of law have been
commented on with some frequency. Maynard notes that "the 'routineness' of a case does not
mean there is an absence of negotiation, but only that it is conducted so as to focus on what
should be done and focus off why it should be done and how prosecution and defense view the
case." See DouOLAs W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BAROAnING 104-07 (1984). Weyrauch
quotes a high-ranking German appellate judge:
A selected group of specialized attorneys who constantly argue cases before us are not
likely to waste our time. They know what we justices want to hear, and they bring just that.
The out-of-town attorneys have no experience before a court of last resort. They talk too
much.
WALTER O. WEYRAUCH, TBE PERSONAITY OF LAWYERS 230 (1964) (citations omitted).
217 This proposition might be tested empirically by correlating the lengths of trials with the
amount of experience trial participants have in working with one another. The theory would
predict shorter trials when the participants are repeat players. The proposition has been asserted
by others. See, e.g., Manik Roy, PollutionPrevention, OrganizationalCulture,and Social Learning, 22 ENvTL. L. 189 (1991) (noting that specialized legal jargons in various environmental
enforcement agencies resulting primarily from the use of different jargon in the laws being enforced "served to heighten [a particular agency's] employees' sense of uniqueness from the
outside world. However, the jargons, unique to each division, isolated them from each other.").
218 Law schools are probably the principal situs of the production of shared mental models of
law. Sensing students' frustration with the completely unwieldy and indeterminate nature of
law, law professors often create for their students a simple, determinate model of the subject that
will be acceptable on the final exam. Bar exams promote the creation of a similar set of models.
In either context, knowing too much written law may be counter-productive because it can easily
lead to misunderstanding between test-taker and grader.
219 Teaching law students and writing articles for submission to journals run by law students
provide opportunities and incentives for legal scholars to re-examine the foundations of our
arguments. Lawyers are subjected to the same discipline when they must present their arguments to an appellate court outside their legal community.
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be recognized as a discipline at least as important as the study of written law.
1. Strategic Analysis of Law.-The idea that law could be analyzed strategically-by spinning out the consequences that a "bad
man" could achieve through its use-goes back at least as far as Oliver Wendell Holmes. 22 0 Examining possible ways that a particular
rule might be used in legal planning is a common technique in the
Socratic classroom. Nevertheless, strategic analysis so far has failed to
achieve academic respectability.
Strategic analysis probably lacks academic respectability because
it depends ultimately on a view of law as determinate. Strategists can
only manipulate legal outcomes if judges are bound by the rules.
Legal scholars assume judges are not and that judges will respond to
the strategies of bad men by nullifying them. Lon L. Fuller was one of
the early voices arguing against the effectiveness of strategic analysis.
He maintained that social and economic constraints prevented bad
men from pursuing their strategies in the courts, and even where they
did not, judges would simply rule against them. Agreeing with Fuller,
P.S. Atiyah dismissed Holmes's bad man theory as failing "to take
into account the simple fact that judges do not like bad men." 221
Fuller and Atiyah are the ones who fail to account for reality.
Legal strategy works. Today, it is one of the principal services the
legal profession provides to its clients. Modem jurisprudential theory
has no way to account for strategy, and so denies its existence. A
220 OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, The Path of the Law, in COLLEC'rD LEGAL PAPERS 167,171
(1920) (observing that "if you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict"). For contemporary examples of strategic analysis, see Mark J. Roe, CorporateStrategic
Reaction to Mass Tor4 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986) (using strategic analysis to test the adequacy of
existing institutions to deal with mass torts); Jeff Stmad, The Taxation of Bonds: The Tax Trading
Dimension, 81 VA. L. REv.47 (1995) (analyzing the rules for tax treatment of bonds issued at a
discount by examining the tax strategies that a sophisticated bond trader might employ).
221 P.S. Atiyah, supranote 125, at 369; see LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QuEST OF ITSELF 92-

95 (1940) (arguing that to understand what judges will do, Holmes's bad man would have to
"look at the law through the eyes of a good man"). Fuller assumes in this passage that the judge
is free, at the moment of decision, to distinguish between good and evil on the basis of natural
law. FULLER, supra, at 92-95. The clear implication is that the judge is never bound by rules of
law to afford Holmes's bad man like treatment with good men in any respect. Fullers assumption is inconsistent with the experience of judges and lawyers. If his assumption were correct,
career criminals and organized crime would find lawyers and legal strategy useless. Fuller would
probably be bewildered by the modem bad man's prescription for problems with legal authorities, which is to "send lawyers, guns and money." See, e.g., WARREN ZEVON, Lawyers, Guns and
Money, on ExcrrABLE Boy (Elektra/Asylum Records 1978). See generally William H. Wilcox,
Taking a Good Look at the Bad Man's Point of View, 66 CORNELL L REV. 1058 (1981) (ac-

knowledging that Holmes's bad man theory of the law increases our understanding of the role of
the legal advisor but cannot explain adjudication).
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theory of determinate law resulting from the mass processing of cases
in accord with shared mental models can fill the gap.
Strategic analysis will work only if it takes into account all aspects
of the environment in which legal strategies must operate. Fuller is
right about the ineffectiveness of strategic analysis that ignores the
strategists' possible loss of friends and customers.2 22 But the solution
is not to abandon strategic analysis; it is to make realistic assumptions
about the loss of friends and relatives and other considerations likely
to affect strategy. The place to begin is with empirical study of the
real environment as reflected in the strategies lawyers employ in it.
In our study of the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly
held companies, 2 23 Whitford and I documented the fact that negotiated settlements of large reorganizations deviated from the legal entitlements 224 of the parties. We asked the lawyers who negotiated them
for the reasons. Their answers were rich with information about the
realities of the environment. We conducted the same kind of inquiry
with regard to the rampant forum shopping we observed. We learned
that debtors shopped at least in part to alter bargaining endowments
and thereby alter outcomes. 22 5 In the world Fuller imagined, such forum shopping would have been futile. The judge at the destination
would have been bound by the same federal law of bankruptcy,
thought no better of the merits of the shopper's case, and perhaps
penalized the shopper a little for the shopper's bad intentions. But in
the world experienced by lawyers, there are local legal cultures and

222 See FULLER, supra note 221, at 92-95.
223 Data from the study are reported in four articles. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 40;
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L REv. 11 [hereinafter LoPucki
& Whitford, Venue Choice]; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669
(1993) [hereinafter CorporateGovernance]; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patternsin
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597

(1993).
224 We used the term "entitlements" only in a positive, not a normative sense. See Ronald J.
Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway?, 70
N.Y.U. L. REv. 993 (1996) (arguing that the concept of entitlements used in the law and economics literature is without normative force).
225 See LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 223, at 29-33.
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system constraints that alter results in even the largest cases. 22 6
Judges themselves have ambitions and strategies for pursuing them.22 7
Law-related systems 22 8 can be analyzed by examining the role of
strategy within them.229 Like Holmes's bad man, today's legal strategist probes for weaknesses and exploitable inconsistencies. By observing what strategies are employed and for what purposes, the
empiricist can construct normative evaluations of particular aspects of
the system and make realistic proposals for change.230 The empiricist
can also evaluate the effectiveness of legal reform by observing the
strategies employed once the reform is in place.
As a method for analysis of legal systems, strategic analysis bears
similarities to economic analysis. Both treat the law as establishing a
pattern of incentives and seek to analyze the law by examining how
persons in the system respond to those incentives. The crucial difference is in how they conduct that examination. Economists simplify
the legal environment to just a few factors. They posit not a flexible
strategist confronted with a situation responsive to imagination, skill,
cleverness, and personal values, but a rigidly rational person whose
"correct" response can be calculated from the model. 231 These sim226 See, eg., Michael Ansaldi, Texaco, Pennzoil and the Revolt of the Masses: A Contracts
Postmortem, 27 Hous. L. REV. 733, 835-36 (1990) (arguing that Pennzoil tested the waters in
Delaware by filing its contract action there and then, based on a positive but lukewarm response,
refiling it in Texas where a jury trial would be available); LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice,
supra note 223, at 34-38 (discussing differences in federal bankruptcy courts that have led to
rampant forum shopping); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of
Forum-Shopping,80 CORNELL L. REv. 1507 (1995) (demonstrating from an analysis of outcomes
in approximately three million federal cases that plaintiffs win 58% of cases overall but only 29%
of cases in which venue is transferred).
227 See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 543 (examining the strategic considerations involved in the
decision of a hypothetical judge and referring to judges' "strategies of execution"); LoPucki &
Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 223, at 30-33, 37-38 (arguing that the scheme of bankruptcy
venue creates incentives for judges to favor venue in their own district and that some bankruptcy
judges have responded to those incentives).
228 By a law-related system I mean the larger societal systems in which law operates, when
viewed as goal-seeking. See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 120, at 271-73.
229 See, eg., Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Creditfrom the Ground Up,
HARv. L. Rv. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with author) (explaining the pattern of
secured credit based on the explanations of debtors and creditors as to their choice of forum);
Mark J. Roe, CorporateStrategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986) (analyzing the
mass tort problem by examining strategies available to actors in the system).
230 Whitford and I concluded, for example, that the best means for dealing with forum shopping in the bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly held companies was to monitor the
kinds of shopping that occurred and the reasons for them. Only when a pattern of forum shopping for system-unintended reasons developed was there a necessity for the system to respond.
See LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supranote 223, at 44-51, 57-58.
231 To respond to this weakness in economic method, Denzau and North have proposed the
substitution of shared mental models based on cognitive theory for what they call "the black box
of the 'rationality' assumption used in economics and rational choice models." Denzau & North,
supra note 78, at 5.
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plifications enable economists to apply logic, mathematics, or game
theory to derive solutions to "economic" problems. But the economic
approach can tell us little about how real people respond to
the com23 2
plex environments in which they actually make decisions.
Institutional economists 233 and some legal scholars23 are attempting to replace the rational person of classical economics with
shared mental models. Strategic analysis parallels this effort by attempting to chart complex environments by empirical observations of
the reactions of real people to them. The most basic technique is to
examine what those persons have done in particular environments,
and then ask them why they did it.235 The principal limitation of this
technique is that real people may not have good analyses of their own
actions or, if they do, may not be very good at explaining them. For
example, lawyers may not raise particular objections during litigation
because they have never thought of them or because others have not
raised them. They may have little or no understanding of why others
have not raised them or what the consequences would have been if
they had. Another limitation on the technique is that lawyers engaged
in strategic behavior may not report truthfully.
Gaming provides a method for overcoming both these limitations. 236 A computer program simulates the strategic environment.
Players, usually working in teams, take on the roles of participants in
the system and seek their own advantage in the play of the game. The
experimenter's goal is to reproduce the dynamics of actual practice.
When the strategic dynamics of the game differ from the strategic dynamics of actual practice, the experimenter adjusts the simulation.
Gaming can examine environments far too complex for game theory.23 7

A third technique, which shares characteristics of each of the

232 Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World. A Reply to Professors Bradley and

Rosenzweig, 91 MicH. L. RE,. 79, 97-110 (1992) (arguing that economic analyses based on assumptions of perfect markets and zero transaction costs are of little or no value).
233 See, e.g., Denzau & North, supra note 78, at 5 (asserting that obtaining an understanding
of mental models is "the most important step that research in the social sciences can make to
replace the black box of the 'rationality' assumption used in economics and rational choice
models").

234 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11 (arguing against basing economic analyses on the assumption of rational decisionmaking and describing alternative decisionmaking algorithms as

"strategies"). But see Scott, supra note 11 (arguing against adjustments to consumer law to attempt to compensate for consumers' cognitive illusions).
235 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 229 (basing analysis on interviews asking borrowers and lenders why loans were or were not made on a secured basis).
236 See, e.g., CATHY S. GREENBLAT, DESIGNING GAMES AND SIMULATIONS: AN ILLUSTRATED
HANDBOOK (1988); CATHY S. GREENBLAT & RICHARD D. DUKE, GAMING-SIMULATION: RATIONALE, DESIGN, AND APPLICATIONS

(1975).

237 See, e.g., LYNN M. LoPucKI, PLAYER'S MANUAL FOR THE DEBTOR CREDITOR GAME

(1985) (describing the environment simulated in the Debtor Creditor Game computer program).
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two already discussed, is simply to describe legal environments and
attempt to hypothesize how real people might respond to them.23 8
2. Simplicity.-As previously discussed, 23 9 written law of a complexity that exceeds the capacities of the human mind inevitably will
be distorted in its routine applications. Its subtlety and refinement
will be lost in application as courts invent their own manageable
bright-line rules. Complex written law can produce a determinate system, but cannot control what it will be. A lawmaker who mandates
that judges exercise discretion is likely to prompt only the generation
of rules of thumb. Balancing tests and mandates to proceed on a caseby-case basis only invite local communities to invent their own rules.
In a landmark article published more than twenty years ago,
Marc Galanter described the complex overlapping relationships that
enable the "haves" to come out ahead in legal dispute resolution. 40
Among other things, Galanter noted the important role of strategy in
the generation of legal outcomes, which he referred to as "restructur[ing] the transaction to escape the thrust of the.., rule." 241 He
recognized that the haves are more adept at strategy in part because
they are better able to control the allegiances of their own lawyers.24 2
He correctly concluded that "changes which relate directly to the strategic position
of the parties ... are the most powerful fulcrum for
change." 243
But in Galanter's model, the haves used their advantages not to
play for the outcomes of particular cases, but to develop favorable
rules of law through case selection. Such advantages are hard-won
over long periods of time, 244 and as Galanter recognized, "the system
has the capacity to change a great deal at the level of [written] rules
without corresponding changes in everyday patterns of practice. '245 If
the principal advantage of the haves were the ability to generate
favorable, though largely indeterminate, rules of law through case selection, the have-nots would have relatively little of which to com238 E.g., LoPuciu, supra note 53 (speculating on strategies effective in bankruptcy
proceedings).
239 See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
240 Galanter, supra note 157.
241 Id. at 149.
242 Id. at 114-19.
243 Id. at 150.

244 Id. at 98-103.
245 Id. at 149. Probably the best example of a campaign of the type Galanter advocates is the
attack of the NAACP on racial discrimination in the public schools. The campaign has been
touted as a phenomenal success because it dramatically changed the written law. However, the
persistence of racial separation in the schools suggests the possibility that the campaign changed
legal rhetoric without changing practices. Strategies for maintaining racial separation in the
schools prevailed over written law.
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plain. In fact, their disadvantage far exceeds that portrayed by
Galanter.
The most important advantage of the haves in securing legal outcomes is strategic manipulation at the level of the particular case. The
haves can be more effective strategists because they start with better
information, they can devote more time and greater skill, and they
have more staying power when they meet resistance. If this is true,
reform of the kind proposed by Galanter-forming organizations of
"one shot" litigators that can employ the techniques of repeat players
to develop favorable rules246 -will be less effective than Galanter supposed. Even if those organizations were successful in controlling the
written law, that would not easily translate into success in controlling
case outcomes. To control outcomes, the strategy of the have-nots
must be manifest in the shared mental models of numerous
communities.
Reducing the complexity of written law might be an effective
means for reducing this kind of strategic advantage. A sufficiently
simple legal system could be incorporated into the shared mental
model in its entirety. Rendering the written law and the shared
mental model of it roughly congruent would open the shared mental
model to scrutiny and analysis. 24 7 It might also cause changes in written law to have greater impact on the shared mental models. As Dean
Roscoe Pound put it, "It is the work of lawyers... to make the law in
action conform to the law in the books.., by making the law in the
books such that the law in action can conform to it."248
How to simplify law is far from obvious. 249 But if law is contained in shared mental models, the appropriate design of a legal system should be informed by cognitive theory. Such a system need not
246 Id.at 141-44, 150-51.
247 Such an endeavor would not be without hazards. "We are told that when contact with the
Romans taught Teutonic peoples that through the written page they could make and alter the
law as well as record it, a great ferment resulted." Pound, supra note 26, at 24. Today, the
ferment would doubtless be among the haves who benefit from the current, strategic state of
affairs.
248 Id.at 36. See Roy, supranote 217, at 245 (advocating "the writing of readable regulations
to make regulatory requirements comprehensible for the regulated community" and noting that
"[g]enerally, state and federal environmental regulations are not written to be easily understood
by the regulated community. Instead, regulations are written to withstand legal challenge.").
249 See articles cited supra note 81. For a bad example, see RicHARD A. EPsTEN, SIMPLE
RuLEs FOR A COMPLEX WOR=D (1995) (advocating a system in which there would be only six

rules: individual autonomy, private property, freedom of contract, protection from aggression
against person or property, limited privileges in cases of necessity, and just compensation for
public takings). Epstein would, for example, make the ownership of all resources depend on
first "possession," id. at 59-63, ignoring the fact that "possession" is merely a legal construct used
to summarize complex rules. LoPuci & WARREN, supra note 183, at 382-87 (deconstructing
"possession"); see also Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995) (arguing that there is an optimal complexity for legal rules).
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be mechanistic, because the human mind that will contain it is not.
Possibly, the most efficient structure for such a system of law would be
one that mimicked the structure of the human mind. 250
3. Writing Unwritten Law.-As previously noted, the law in
shared mental models differs from the written law in important respects. The law in shared mental models is simpler and more determinate. It addresses a different range of issues. The law in shared
mental models also focuses more heavily on outcomes than does written law, rendering those outcomes more predictable.251
The function of a legal community is to deliver legal outcomes.
Viewed from the perspective of the lawyers' clients, the particular
mechanisms by which it delivers them-by settlement or by litigation,
in proceedings under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13-does not matter. The
client is interested in how much the system will cost, how long the
system will take, what the system will require of the client along the
way, and what the system will deliver in the end.
Those practical outcomes, which I will refer to as the delivered
law, are sometimes the products of complex interactions 252 among
various aspects of substantive and procedural law. By these interactions, the legal system calculates its "bottom line," the delivered law
applicable to any particular category of conduct or situation. The delivered law typically is known to members of the community 253 and
constitutes part of the community's shared mental model. It may be
far simpler than the written law and bear only the remotest relationship to it.
250 See MiNsKY, supra note 45 (attempting to explain the structure of the human mind by
explaining the structure of a computer program that could mimic it).
251 That is, shared mental models are more likely than written law to address the ultimate
issues of what parties can or cannot accomplish through litigation. Written law facilitates the
sequential determinations of issues, supposedly tolerating whatever outcome emerges from the
process. Ultimately, shared mental models tend to prevail, through the mechanism of wholecase realism. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (describing whole-case realism).
252 These interactions may be real or projected hypothetically in the minds of the legal
strategists.
253 But this is not always the case. Members of the community may be unaware of the pattern
of outcomes their interaction generates. See Paul Brest, In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination
Principle,90 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1976) (discussing "racially selective indifference"); Clark, supra
note 147, at 1241 ("I am certain that both particular legal scholars and the entire legal culture
can follow intellectual patterns without being aware of them and that it is both possible and
useful to discover those patterns.") Walter 0. Weyrauch, Taboo and Magic in Law, 25 STAN. L
REV. 782, 803-07 (1973) (documenting that seemingly neutral criminal sentencing procedures
produce surprising racial disparities). Members of the legal community that process the bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly held companies were surprised by aggregate data showing management turnover in their cases to be almost universal. See Lynn LoPucki & Whitford,
CorporateGovernance, supra note 223, at 723-37 (1993).
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For example, the written law of bankruptcy proclaims generally
that bankruptcy is "only for the honest debtor 254 and specifies numerous types of dishonest conduct as bases for denial of bankruptcy
discharge. 25 5 The delivered law on the discharge of dishonest debtors
is far different than what those provisions would suggest. A discharge
is denied only when some interested party files an adversary proceeding objecting to

it.256

The system pointedly fails to provide incentives

57
for either creditors or trustees to bring the necessary proceeding.
Although the pressures of unmanageable debt often drive debtors to
conduct that provides bases for objections to their discharge, objections are rare.25 s In most communities, the delivered law is precisely
the opposite of the substantive written law: a dishonest debtor can
almost certainly obtain a bankruptcy discharge.
Delivered law usually emanates from adjudication or the threat
of adjudication. Settlements of litigation may be nothing more than
agreements to accept what the parties think courts would award. 259
But projected results in adjudication are not the only possible basis for
settlement. When parties do not consider adjudication a viable option, settlement negotiations emerge from adjudication's shadow.
Routine case processing may establish a pattern of settlement that
254 See, eg., In re Hunter, 771 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Congress established a fraud
exception to discharge 'to discourage fraudulent conduct and to ensure that relief intended for
honest debtors does not inure to the benefit of the dishonest.' "); Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank
v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Congress sought to discourage fraudulent conduct
and ensure that relief intended for honest debtors does not inure to the benefit of dishonest
ones.").
255 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1994) (fraudulent transfers of property), 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)
(fraudulent testimony or withholding of information), 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) (failure to explain
loss or deficiency of assets), 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (failure to cooperate with the court), or 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(7) (fraud in connection with another bankruptcy case).
256 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1) (1994).
257 A creditor usually is better advised to object to discharge of only the debt owing to the
creditor, not to discharge of the debtor generally. Winning a denial of discharge rarely leads to
the payment of the debt, because it is a rare debtor who has resources to pay a substantial
portion of his or her debts, yet files bankruptcy. Settling an objection to discharge in return for
payment is prohibited by Bankruptcy Rule 7041. 11 U.S.C.A. Rule 7041 (West Supp. 1995).
The trustee has a duty to "oppose the discharge of the debtor" if advisable. 11 U.S.C.
§ 704(6) (1994). But neither the trustee nor the trustee's lawyer can be paid for litigating the
objection unless there are assets in the estate from which to make payment. In approximately
95% of the cases, there are no assets. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASE RECEIPTS
PAID TO CREDITORS AND PROFESSIONALS 1-2 (July 1994); see supra note 124.

258 A study of almost 1600 bankruptcy court files failed to discover even a single objection to
discharge. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 265-66 (1989) ("We
could not detect any cases of fraud, nor did we find any creditor objections to a debtor's discharge based on an allegation of fraud."). Their findings are consistent with my experience in
representing debtors or serving as a bankruptcy trustee in approximately 400 cases.
259 Such settlements are usually said to occur "in the shadow of the law." See Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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deviates systematically from legal entitlements and produces an independent pattern of delivered law. Earlier, I presented the example
of plans of bankruptcy reorganization that provide for distributions to
creditors and shareholders that deviate from entitlements under the
absolute priority rule.260 In the largest bankruptcy reorganizations,
the rule seems to be that everyone at the bargaining table gets something.261 In the smallest cases, the absolute priority rule stands on its
head; equity nearly always retains 100% ownership of the company
and only the creditors' rights are diminished, giving shareholders absolute priority over creditors.262 Parties offered less than their entitlements in adjudication may not be free to test those entitlements in
settlement
court; violation of the distributional norm that requires
263
may cause the group to impose punitive sanctions.
The concept of delivered law is similar to, but different from, the
broader concept of "law in action." Many of the best examples of the
gap between law in action and law on the books result from disputants' ignorance of the law or reluctance to employ it.264 But they are
not examples of delivered law diverging from law on the books. A
legal outcome qualifies as delivered law only if the disputant to whom
it was delivered pressed for the best result the system would give. Differences in delivered law are differences in the coercive effect of law
through the imposition of sanctions, not merely differences in local
preferences, customs, or culture.
People affected by the legal system want to know what the system
will do, not what the written law says. Nevertheless, few attempts
have been made to reduce delivered law to writing. The principal impediment seems to be that delivered law differs from community to
260 Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
261 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 40, at 142 (documenting that distributions to equity
holders are the norm in reorganizations in which creditors receive more than approximately 15%
of their claims).
262 See LoPucki, supra note 24, at 264-65 (finding that owner-managers retained full ownership and control of 9 of 12 surviving businesses and that only 4 of the 41 businesses studied
underwent a change in ownership and control).
263 For example, members of the group may disparage the dissenter as having acted unprofessionally or irresponsibly and thereby interfere with the dissenter's other business relationships.
A party's violation of settlement norms also may prevent the party from forming otherwise
available alliances in the continuing litigation. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 40, at 154-58.
264 See, eg., Ellickson, supranote 50, at 668-73 (finding that cattle ranchers in Shasta County
neither knew of their rights to compensation from neighbors for trespass by cattle nor wished to
exercise those rights); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensationand Punishment,74 GEo. LJ. 1313,
1326 (1986) ("One half of the rule 11 opinions in the first two years came from two large urban
districts... [that together] ... accounted for only 7.8% of the federal court civil filings during
the period beginning July 1, 1983 and ending June 30, 1985."); HERBERT JACOB, DEBTORS IN
COURT 87 (1969) (rate of garnishment of only 2.1 per thousand in Green Bay, Wisconsin, compared with 30.7 per thousand in Racine, Wisconsin).
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community, making the markets for publication narrow. But there
are other impediments as well. Reduction of the delivered law to
writing tends to embarrass members of the community, particularly
judges, because it demonstrates that they are administering a system
not mandated by written law and sometimes in contravention of written law.265 Only a member of the community is likely to be qualified
to author a work about the delivered law of a legal community, yet by
doing so the member may compromise his or her position in the
community.
Attempts to reduce delivered law to writing generally have suffered from the failure of the editors and contributing lawyers to distinguish it from the written law. 266 On particular points, however, some
attempts have succeeded brilliantly. For example, the following passage is the answer of a Missouri lawyer to the question "What is your
jurisdiction's position on... [contractual devices designed to prevent
a debtor from filing bankruptcy]":
There are no reported decisions on this subject. [Such contractual devices] are not being used in Missouri due to the belief that the bankruptcy court will not enforce the contract. 267
The passage distinguishes the written law (there are no reported decisions) from the delivered law (bankruptcy proofing devices are ineffective in Missouri). Use of the word "belief," without identification
of the believer, suggests reference to the shared mental model of the
legal community.
The process of drafting opinions causes judges to engage in careful examination of particular cases. For that reason alone, opinions
serve an important function in a common-law system. But opinions
are highly case-specific and for that reason are an inefficient way for
trial court judges to communicate what they are doing.268 Judges occasionally break from the traditional form by reciting delivered law in
administrative orders or opinions, typically referring to the rules as
guidelines or rules of thumb. 269 Judges and lawyers can make law
265 Weyrauch states, "Disclosure of bias may be felt to be embarrassing. One of the many
functions of law may be to minimize this embarrassment by giving a tranquilizing appearance of
objectivity. . . while participating in a process that still has retained much of its ancient flavor of
naked power." WEYRAuCH, supra note 216, at 244.
266 E.g., SIDNEY A. KEYLEs, FoREcLosuRE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES (1995).
267 Id. at 341. Many of the answers in FoREcLosuRE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES are simply
citations to appellate cases that recite multi-part balancing tests that are of virtually no use in
learning what officials do in response to cases.
268 Bankruptcy judges work at the trial court level, but most write numerous opinions, hardly
distinguishable from those of appellate courts.
269 See, e.g., In re Zwern, 181 B.R. 80, 86 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) ("Some Judges review each
case individually; others informally use a 'rule of thumb' of $1,200. Judge Matheson has held
that a fee of $1,000 is appropriate for the average Chapter 13 case without any unusual, troublesome or unique issues."); McCall v. Barnett Bank, 74 B.R. 666, 668 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) ("A
rule of thumb used by many courts is that sale for less than 70 percent of value is avoidable
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more accessible to the governed by writing the unwritten rules of delivered law as they exist in local legal culture. 270
V.

CONCLUSION

Decades of careful empiricism have demonstrated that the pattern of legal outcomes differs from one legal culture to another in
ways not explainable by written law. This Article attempts to account
for the differences- as the product of mental models forged in and
shared by legal communities. Like the more general mental models
proposed by Johnson-Laird and Holland, these mental models of law

consist of condition-action rules of varying levels of generality that
provide the dialectic by which the community processes cases.
Shared mental models are also capable of explaining other legal
phenomena that theorists have so far ignored. Among them are lawyers' abiding sense that the law is determinate, the development and
use of "rules of thumb" in processing cases, and the success of legal
strategy.
Support for the theories presented in this Article is largely anecdotal. I have attempted, however, to present the theories in terms
sufficiently concrete that they can be operationalized 271 and tested
empirically.
The concept of shared mental models of law has important implications for legal theory and legal practice. Law exists principally in
the minds of members of the legal community. Because the law in
lawyers' heads is a simplified version of the law on the books, it will
necessarily differ from it. Because it is manufactured in the local community and path dependent, it also can be expected to differ from
community to community. The process is functional because it renders legal outcomes predictable and makes the local legal community
a more efficient processor of cases than it otherwise could be.
Continuing legal education is now discovering the rich, important
realm of delivered law that currently exists only in the shared mental
models of legal communities. Once judges and lawyers recognize that
the law on the books and the law in their shared mental models are
under § 548(a)(2) [as a fraudulent conveyance]."); In re Access Equip., Inc., 62 B.R. 642, 646
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) ("If the option price amounts to 25% or more of the total list price, then
the 'lease' is not one intended for security."). Informative as these rules are, because of the way
they were derived, they are not legitimately part of the written law.
270 Explication of the law in lawyers' heads is unlikely to delegitimate written law. Official
law already shares power with various systems of indigenous law. See Galanter, supra note 82, at
161-64. The identification of one more type-even one so powerful-is unlikely to bring the
system down. The advantage in explicating the law in lawyers' heads is that it is sufficiently
simple that lay persons could understand it. Law might become an effective communication
between lawmaker and subject.
271 See supra note 22.
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two different things, they can see the latter for what it is and more
accurately reduce it to written form. 2 72 The pattern of Balkanization

inevitably produced by an oral legal tradition suggests that such a tradition is not well suited to the governance of a society as large and
well integrated as the United States. 273 Reduction of the delivered
law to written form would make the legal system more accessible to
those governed by it. That in turn would foster civic debate, facilitate
compliance, make the economy more efficient, and enhance individual
autonomy. Reduction of the delivered law to written form would encourage strategic behavior, but not all strategic behavior is bad. To
the extent it encouraged system-unintended behavior, the reduction
ideally would act as a catalyst for reform.
The study of legal strategy potentially provides, for empiricists, a
powerful tool for the evaluation of law-related systems. Strategists
constantly probe the legal system searching for advantage and uncovering weaknesses. By charting their movements, empiricists can
quickly identify systemic weakness and perhaps even prevent the
kinds of system-unintended change that unchecked legal strategy can
cause.

272 The reduction to writing may itself alter the "autonomous" law contained in shared
mental models. The exploration of that possibility is beyond the scope of this Article.
273 See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 9, at 377 (concluding that "oral systems do not address
themselves to the needs of a mass society as such, even though they satisfy the needs of the
smaller units that comprise a mass society").
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